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Abstract 
This paper examines the economic consequences of voluntary IFRS adoptions around the world. 
In contrast to prior work, we focus on the heterogeneity in the consequences, recognizing that 
firms have considerable discretion in how they adopt IFRS. Some firms may simply adopt a label, 
while others view the decision as a serious commitment to transparency. We hypothesize that the 
economic consequences depend on the extent to which IFRS adoptions represent a serious 
commitment to transparency. Our results support this prediction. We classify firms into “label” 
and “serious” adopters and analyze whether capital markets respond to differences in adoption 
quality, using proxies for market liquidity and the cost of capital. We find that the average effects 
of voluntary IFRS reporting on these proxies are generally modest, especially when compared to 
other forms of commitment such as cross-listing in the U.S. However, consistent with our 
predictions, we find that “serious” adopters experience significantly stronger effects on the cost of 
capital and market liquidity than label adopters. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last number of years the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) has gained considerable momentum around the world.1  Almost 100 countries have either 
moved to IFRS for financial reporting purposes or decided to adopt them at some point in the near 
future (www.iasplus.com).  But even before IFRS became mandatory, many firms around the 
world have voluntarily adopted or switched to IFRS.  In this paper, we examine the economic 
consequences of these voluntary IFRS adoptions as they are likely to offer important insights into 
the effects of the upcoming reporting regime changes in many countries. 
There are several studies analyzing the effects of voluntary IFRS adoptions prior to our work 
(e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Barth et al., 2005; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006).2  
These studies typically focus on the average IFRS effect with respect to some outcome variable 
(e.g., earnings quality, liquidity, cost of capital), and the results are often mixed.  However, there 
is little research on the cross-sectional differences in the adoption effects and the reasons for this 
heterogeneity.  Moreover, most studies characterize the observed effects as being attributable to 
IFRS adoption per se, neglecting the underlying forces driving the adoption decision.  Analyzing 
the cross-sectional variation in the adoption effects is informative in this regard and allows us to 
shed light on the question of whether the observed capital market effects likely stem from IFRS 
reporting per se. 
Our main prediction is that the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions exhibit 
considerable heterogeneity resulting from differences in the extent to which firms make 
                                                 
1  International Accounting Standards (IAS) were renamed to IFRS in 2001.  In this paper, we use IAS and IFRS 
interchangeably but we do not presume that earlier IAS and later IFRS adoptions necessarily have the same 
consequences.  In principle, our tests are equipped to capture differences between these adoptions. 
2  We review this literature in more detail in Section 2. 
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substantial changes to their reporting and disclosure policies.  IFRS, like any other set of 
accounting standards, offers firms substantial discretion in applying the standards.  Moreover, 
firms’ reporting incentives are different and the strength of enforcement differs considerably 
across countries (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2005; Lang et al., 2006; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006).  For these reasons, one frequently voiced concern is that some firms 
may adopt IFRS merely as a label without making material changes in their reporting policies 
(e.g., Ball, 2001, 2006).  Other firms may adopt IFRS as part of a serious commitment to increase 
transparency.  Our study is designed to examine these differences.  Provided that market 
participants can differentiate between “label” and “serious” adopters, we should observe 
differential market reactions and economic consequences.  IFRS adoptions that are part of a 
serious commitment to transparency are likely to reduce information asymmetry, uncertainty and 
estimation risk, and hence should be rewarded with a lower cost of capital and higher market 
liquidity (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Lambert et al., 2007a). 
To examine these hypotheses, we analyze a large panel of IFRS (and IAS) adoptions from 
1988 to 2004 across 24 countries.  The sample is drawn from the universe of active and inactive 
firms on Worldscope.  We identify IFRS adoptions based on the classifications in Worldscope, 
Global Vantage, and an extensive hand-collection of firms’ annual reports.3  After combining and 
cross-checking these sources, we provide descriptive evidence on the frequency of IFRS 
adoptions as well as adoption trends around the world.  As expected, the number of firms 
reporting under IFRS is steadily increasing over the years.  There is also substantial cross-
sectional variation in the frequency of voluntary adoptions across countries, which is important to 
                                                 
3  In Appendix A, we provide a comparison of the three classifications. 
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consider when analyzing the effects of recent regime shifts towards mandatory IFRS reporting in 
several countries. 
As a first step, we analyze whether IFRS firms exhibit a lower cost of capital and higher 
market liquidity relative to local GAAP firms and to themselves prior to the adoption of IFRS.  
We use the implied cost of capital, the percentage bid-ask spread, and a measure of stock 
illiquidity suggested by Amihud (2002).  Based on these variables, we find little evidence that 
IFRS reporting is on average associated with a lower cost of capital or higher market liquidity, 
after controlling for firm characteristics, “New Market” listings, U.S. cross-listings, index 
membership, and industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects.  We obtain similar results for 
voluntary U.S. GAAP adoptions that are not due to U.S. cross-listings.  In contrast, cross-listings 
in the U.S. are associated with a lower cost of capital and higher stock liquidity, suggesting that 
measurement error in our dependent variables and lack of power are unlikely to be responsible for 
our findings. 
As the second and main step, we analyze the heterogeneity in the economic consequences 
across firms.  Towards this end, we construct four measures to capture the seriousness or quality 
of IFRS adoptions.  Our first measure is based on the idea that IFRS reporting and a serious 
commitment to more transparency should increase the quantity of disclosures that firms make in 
their annual reports.  We therefore analyze the length of firms’ annual reports around the adoption 
of IFRS and classify firms into serious and label adopters based on the change in page numbers of 
the annual report around the adoption year.  Although this measure is admittedly crude and likely 
to be noisy, it allows us to classify a large set of firms in an objective fashion.  Our second 
measure relies on two survey reports by Cairns (1999, 2000).  In these surveys, Cairns analyzes 
the annual reports of 290 firms with respect to their adoption approach (e.g., full adoption, dual 
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reporting, some reference to IAS) as well as their compliance with IAS.  We use the compliance 
score to differentiate between serious and label adopters.  Our third proxy uses changes in the 
quality of reported earnings as a way to differentiate between serious and label adopters.  
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we rely on the magnitude of accruals relative to the cash flow from 
operations as a simple characterization of earnings quality and use changes in this metric around 
IFRS adoptions to classify firms.  Our fourth and final measure is built on the idea that the quality 
of IFRS adoptions likely depends on firms’ reporting incentives.  We characterize firms’ 
reporting incentives using a factor analysis of firm size, profitability, foreign sales, financing 
needs, growth opportunities, and ownership concentration.  Specifically, we expect firms that are 
larger, more profitable, more international, have larger financing needs, larger growth 
opportunities, and more dispersed ownership structures to have stronger incentives for transparent 
financial reporting.  We extract a factor that has consistent loadings for all these variables and use 
the distribution of factor scores to split firms into serious and label adopters.4
Using these four partitioning variables, we provide evidence indicating that serious IFRS 
adopters experience larger declines in the cost of capital and larger increases in market liquidity.  
Specifically, serious IFRS adopters exhibit a decrease in the cost of capital between 45 and 160 
basis points relative to the label adopters.  The results are very similar across all four serious/label 
partitions and significant in three cases.  For the liquidity measures, we find that serious adopters 
experience a larger decrease in the bid-ask spreads than label adopters for all partitions.  The 
differences are significant, except for the page number partition where they are close to 
conventional significance levels.  We also find that serious adopters experience a larger decline in 
                                                 
4  It is important to note that the construction of this split variable allows for the possibility that firms with strong 
reporting incentives already provide high-quality reports under local GAAP.  Thus, it does not require that there 
is a change in reporting incentives (or reporting quality) around IFRS adoption. 
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the Amihud illiquidity measure.  The effects are significant for two of the partitions and point in 
the same direction for the others.  Thus, our findings are consistent across all metrics. 
Finally, comparing IFRS and local GAAP firms, we find evidence that the effect of serious 
adoptions is generally negative for the cost of capital and positive for market liquidity, consistent 
with the notion that a commitment to transparency lowers the cost of capital and increases market 
liquidity.  However, consistent with our argument that the commitment value of IFRS reporting 
itself is low, the net effects are small and often statistically insignificant.  For the cost of capital, 
only the reporting incentives partition exhibits a significantly negative effect for serious adopters 
(roughly 55 basis points).  For the liquidity measures, the results are stronger, but still modest. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature.  First, to our knowledge, this is the 
first study to analyze the heterogeneity in the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions for a 
large sample of firms around the world.  By documenting that the effects differ with firms’ 
reporting incentives and the extent to which firms make serious changes to their reporting 
strategies, we show that one has to exercise caution in attributing the effects (and prior findings) 
to IFRS reporting per se.  Second, our study suggests that markets can differentiate between 
firms’ adoption strategies.  This result is important as there is considerable concern that the global 
trend towards a single set of accounting standards masks the heterogeneity in actual reporting 
practices and hence makes it harder for investors to evaluate firms’ reporting quality (e.g., Ball, 
2006).  Third, our study uses a considerable amount of hand-collection to cross-check and 
complement readily available classifications of firms’ accounting standards.  Our comparisons 
highlight that the classifications in Worldscope and Global Vantage are problematic for a variety 
of reasons and have to be used cautiously. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops our hypotheses and 
reviews the literature.  Section 3 delineates our research design and describes the data.  Section 4 
presents our analyses and results.  Section 5 concludes.  The Appendix provides a comparison of 
accounting standards classifications and describes the construction of our implied cost of capital 
measures. 
2. Conceptual Underpinnings and Literature Review 
2.1 Hypothesis Development 
The starting point of our study is the hypothesis that there likely is predictable heterogeneity 
in the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions and that this heterogeneity can be explained in 
part by differences in firms’ reporting incentives and by the extent to which firms make 
substantial changes to their reporting and disclosure policies.  Some firms may adopt IFRS 
merely as a label without making material changes, whereas other firms may adopt IFRS as part 
of a broader strategy that credibly commits them to more transparency. 
The conceptual underpinnings of these hypotheses are recent studies highlighting the 
importance of firms’ reporting incentives, rather than accounting standards, as key drivers of 
observed accounting properties and actual practices.5  This literature calls into question the extent 
to which the adoption of IFRS alone can provide a credible commitment to transparency.  IFRS 
like any other set of accounting standards affords firms with substantial discretion as the 
application of accounting standards involves judgment and the underlying measurements are 
often based on private information.  The way in which firms use this discretion is likely to depend 
on their reporting incentives, which are shaped by many factors, including countries’ institutional 
                                                 
5  The literature on the role of reporting incentives versus standards is rapidly growing.  Examples are Ball et al. 
(2000, 2003), Leuz (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Lang et al. (2006), and Burgstahler et al. (2006). 
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frameworks, various market forces and firm characteristics.6  As a result, it is not clear that the 
adoption of IFRS itself materially shapes firms’ reporting behavior.  It is important to note that 
this is not just an enforcement issue.  Even with perfect enforcement, observed reporting behavior 
will differ as long as the accounting standards offer some discretion (which they generally do for 
a good reason) and firms’ reporting incentives are different (Leuz, 2006). 
These arguments cast doubt on whether we can attribute changes in reporting quality and 
associated capital-market effects around IFRS adoptions to IFRS itself.  Rather than the 
standards, the effects may reflect the differences in the incentives for credible reporting and the 
circumstances that led to the adoption of IFRS in the first place.  The reporting incentives view 
also implies predictable cross-sectional variation in the economic consequences of IFRS 
adoptions.  For instance, we expect that firms with strong reporting incentives are more likely to 
adopt IFRS in ways that entail material changes to their reporting policies and that firms with 
weak reporting incentives are more likely to adopt IFRS as a label.  Some firms may also adopt 
IFRS as part of a broader strategy that credibly commits a firm to more transparency.  For 
instance, along with IFRS adoption, a firm may hire a higher quality auditor, improve corporate 
governance, change its ownership structure, or seek a cross-listing in stricter regimes.  To the 
extent that the overall strategy is difficult to mimic (or more costly) for firms that are not serious 
about transparency, it constitutes a credible commitment.7  In this case, markets likely react 
favorably, e.g., by lowering the cost of capital, but the reaction reflects the entire commitment 
strategy, and IFRS adoption is only a proxy for this strategy (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
                                                 
6  This insight is also at the heart of the accounting choice and earnings management literature.  See Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Dechow and Skinner (2000). 
7  This argument is similar to the bonding hypothesis for U.S. cross-listings (e.g., Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999).  The 
bonding hypothesis also presumes that cross-listing in the U.S. is more attractive for firms with large financing 
needs and growth opportunities, and that it entails higher costs for firms where insiders consume large private 
control benefits and engage in expropriating outside investors (Doidge et al., 2004). 
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In sum, we expect markets to react more favorably to IFRS adoptions where firms make 
material and credible changes to their reporting and disclosure policies than to cases where firms 
merely adopt a label.8  An alternative hypothesis is that IFRS adoption leads to relatively 
homogenous reporting quality across firms and hence that the heterogeneity in the economic 
consequences stems from prior differences in reporting quality, rather than from the quality of 
IFRS adoption.  This hypothesis predicts different cross-sectional effects: firms with lower 
reporting quality prior to the switch experience more positive effects (holding all else equal) 
because they experience a larger improvement in reporting quality by switching to IFRS.  In 
contrast, the reporting incentives view suggests that there are reasons why these firms have lower 
reporting quality in the first place and that these reasons make them more likely to engage in label 
adoptions, suggesting smaller or less positive effects. 
Our main hypothesis for the observed heterogeneity presupposes that markets can discern 
between serious and label adoptions, at least imperfectly.  One concern is that discretion in 
reporting standards and lack of enforcement make it difficult and very costly for investors to 
figure out the extent to which firms are serious about their IFRS adoption.  Along these lines, Ball 
(2006) argues that IFRS adoption is almost costless for countries and that it may be even less 
costly for countries with lower-quality institutions, both of which likely makes IFRS adoption 
uninformative about reporting quality.  Thus, it is also possible that the market does not respond 
to IFRS adoptions or that the reaction is fairly similar across firms. 
                                                 
8  We note that it is also possible that there is no market reaction when a firm with strong reporting incentives 
adopts IFRS.  A serious adopter may have been as committed before the switch to IFRS and may have provided 
essentially the same information in its local GAAP report.  This possibility biases our changes analyses towards 
zero and hence against our hypothesis.  Our levels tests (using the Cairns survey reports and the reporting 
incentives partitions) explicitly allow for this possibility.  See Section 3.1. 
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To test these hypotheses, we examine economic consequences of IFRS adoptions as a 
function of observable characteristics of firms’ reporting policies (and changes therein).  It is 
important to note that this approach does not attempt to identify the marginal effect of IFRS 
adoption.  To the contrary, the point of our study is to highlight that the estimated coefficient on 
an IFRS indicator variable cannot be simply attributed to IFRS reporting per se and that it likely 
reflects differences in factors that determine the extent to which firms are serious about their 
commitment to transparency. 
We also realize that our inferences are limited if we find that observable characteristics do not 
explain cross-sectional variation in the economic consequences.  In this case, we do not know 
whether the characteristics do not explain meaningful variation in firms’ reporting policies or 
whether investors simply cannot (or do not) differentiate between serious and label adopters. 
A final conceptual issue is the expected market reaction to label adoptions if markets can 
discern between serious and label adoptions.  One reasonable prediction is that the effect is 
essentially zero or negligible.  Alternatively, the market reaction could be adverse, reflecting that 
a label adoption reveals to investors that the firm is unwilling to commit more seriously to 
transparency.  Moreover, label adoptions may increase investor uncertainty, e.g., because the lack 
of a long earnings history makes it harder to forecast future earnings under the new accounting 
regime.  But if markets can unravel label adoptions and react unfavorably, why do firms adopt 
IFRS in the first place?  One potential explanation is prior evidence that managers sometimes 
engage in seemingly strategic reporting behavior, despite the fact that markets unravel their 
accounting choices and price them accordingly (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Schrand and 
Walther, 2000).  Allowing for this possibility, we do not sign our expectation for the effects of 
label adoptions relative to local GAAP firms. 
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2.2 Related Studies 
Despite the large and increasing number of international reporting studies, there is not much 
research that exploits or analyzes heterogeneity in the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions.  
Prior empirical studies on the economic effects of voluntary IFRS adoptions can be broadly 
classified into (1) studies that examine the quality of IFRS financial statements relative to other 
GAAP financial statements (including U.S. GAAP) as well as firms’ compliance with IFRS, (2) 
studies that analyze the average capital-market effects of IFRS adoptions, primarily in terms of 
market liquidity and cost of capital, and (3) studies that examine other effects of IFRS adoptions, 
e.g., on analyst forecasts and mutual fund holdings.9  Our study is closest to the second stream of 
research, but it also relates to the empirical findings in the other categories. 
In the first category, Harris and Muller (1999), Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002), Eccher and 
Healy (2000), Bartov et al. (2005), Hung and Subramanyam (2007) analyze the value relevance 
of IAS accounting numbers relative to local GAAP and/or U.S. GAAP numbers and generally 
find mixed evidence relative to either benchmark.  Barth et al. (2005 and 2006) compute a broad 
set of earnings quality metrics for firms using IAS and compare them to those for firms using 
local GAAP and U.S. GAAP, respectively.  The evidence suggests that IAS reports are of higher 
quality than local GAAP reports but of lower quality than U.S. GAAP numbers.  Using a set of 
German firms only, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Goncharov and Zimmermann 
(2006) find little evidence that IAS curb the level of earnings management relative to German 
GAAP, whereas the evidence in Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) suggests that IFRS numbers are of 
higher quality.  Daske and Gebhardt (2006) use annual report quality scores assigned by 
                                                 
9  In addition, there are studies providing evidence on the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoptions (e.g., Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Ashbaugh, 2001; Tarca, 2004; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Renders and Gaeremynck, 
2005) as well as studies examining the determinants and effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in certain 
countries (e.g., Comprix et al., 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Hope et al., 2006). 
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accounting experts to assess changes in reporting quality and find that IFRS reporting is 
associated with higher perceived quality as reflected in higher quality scores. 
A related set of studies examines how firms comply with IFRS.  Using IASC’s list of IAS 
adopters, Cairns (1999, 2000) examines firms’ adoption approaches (e.g., full adoption, dual 
reporting, and reconciliations) and their compliance with IAS.  In a similar fashion, Street and 
Bryant (2000), Glaum and Street (2003), and Gebhardt and Heilmann (2004) use disclosure 
checklists to determine the level of compliance of IAS firms relative to other sets of firms.  All 
these studies document substantial non-compliance with IAS, but they are based on fairly small 
samples and do not examine the capital-market effects of non-compliance.10
Studies in the second category focus on the capital-market effects of IFRS adoptions.11 Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) examine information asymmetry and market liquidity proxies for German 
firms adopting IAS and U.S. GAAP.  They find that IAS and U.S. GAAP firms exhibit lower bid-
ask spreads and higher turnover than German GAAP firms as well as a decrease in spreads and 
turnover around IAS or U.S. GAAP adoption.  Examining firms in Germany’s New Market, Leuz 
(2003) finds that the differences in spreads, turnover, and IPO underpricing are statistically and 
economically insignificant across IAS and U.S. GAAP firms, suggesting that both sets of firms 
are characterized by similar information asymmetries. 
More recent studies focus on the cost of capital effects of IFRS reporting and produce mixed 
evidence.  Barth et al. (2005) document a decrease in the cost of capital around IFRS adoption 
                                                 
10  Using a larger sample of non-U.S. firms around the world, Bradshaw and Miller (2005) also find substantial 
non-compliance among firms that have voluntarily adopted U.S. GAAP. 
11  In addition to the long-window studies reviewed below, there are a few short-window studies analyzing 
announcement returns to IFRS adoptions (e.g., Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2005).  However, these market 
reactions also capture news effects that are potentially associated with the adoption of IFRS.  For instance, the 
market may infer new growth opportunities from the announcement to adopt IFRS.  Thus, this research design 
is less suited to isolate the effects of IFRS reporting. 
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using expected returns from the Fama-French three-factor model.  Using implied cost of capital 
estimates, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) do not find significant differences across local GAAP and 
IFRS firms in the EU.  Daske (2006) presents evidence that German IFRS firms have a higher 
cost of equity capital than local GAAP firms.  
The third category comprises a small set of studies examining other effects of IFRS adoptions.  
They do not use capital-market reactions but instead focus on the behavior of financial statement 
users.  Using a small sample of IAS adoptions before 1993, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) present 
evidence suggesting that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after IAS adoption.  Cuijpers and 
Buijink (2005) find an increase in analyst following around IFRS, but the effect is not robust to 
controls for self selection.  Covrig et al. (2007) document that foreign mutual fund ownership is 
significantly higher for IFRS adopters compared to local GAAP firms and that the difference in 
mutual fund holdings increases for firms in poor information environments and with low 
visibility, suggesting that IFRS reporting can help firms attract foreign institutional investment. 
In sum, there are a number of studies suggesting that firms reporting under IFRS enjoy 
substantial benefits.  The evidence, however, is far from conclusive and in many cases mixed.  
Further, it is not clear that the documented benefits can be attributed to the adoption of IFRS, i.e., 
to the standards themselves.  For instance, the benefits could stem from broader commitments to 
more transparency by some firms.  Moreover, the studies generally focus on the average effects 
of IFRS adoption and do not examine the cross-sectional differences in adoption quality and 
compliance.  Heterogeneity across IFRS adoptions could be one reason for the mixed results in 
prior studies.  To address this void, our study focuses on cross-sectional differences in the 
adoption effects and the drivers of this heterogeneity in the economic effects. 
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3. Research Design and Data 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the heterogeneity in the economic 
consequences of IFRS adoptions.  Towards this goal, we need a variable indicating whether firms 
use IFRS or local GAAP as well as a classification capturing differences in adoption strategies, 
i.e., the degree to which firms make material changes to their reporting policies or the extent to 
which they are committed to transparency.  We also need proxies for the economic consequences 
and a set of control variables.  We combine these ingredients in the following model: 
EconCon = β0 + β1 IFRS + β2 Serious IFRS Adopters + ∑ βj Controlsj + ε (1) 
where EconCon stands for three different proxies for the economic consequences (i.e., cost of 
capital, bid-ask spreads, and illiquidity), IFRS is a binary variable coded as ‘1’ if the firm uses 
IFRS in a given year and ‘0’ otherwise, Serious IFRS Adopters denotes four binary classifications 
used to identify serious and label adopters, and Controlsj denotes a set of control variables.  To 
estimate this model, we obtain financial data from Worldscope, return, bid-ask spreads and 
trading volume data from Datastream, and analyst forecasts and share price data for cost of capital 
estimation from I/B/E/S.  The sample consists of all Worldscope firms from 1988 to 2004 for 
which we have the necessary data to compute the variables described in more detail below.12
3.1 IFRS Classifications 
Coding IFRS reporting is not a trivial exercise as firms have chosen many different adoption 
strategies, particularly in the early days of IAS.  As described in more detail in Appendix A, we 
deliberately use a broad and relatively basic classification in order to capture a wide variety of 
adoption policies and, in particular, to include firms that merely create the appearance of IFRS 
                                                 
12  We exclude observations in 2005 because we study voluntary IFRS adoptions and, starting in 2005, IFRS 
reporting became mandated in many countries (e.g., in all member countries of the European Union). 
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reporting.  Furthermore, we combine and triangulate multiple sources to identify as many IFRS 
adopters as possible and to improve the accuracy of the reporting classification. 
We begin the coding procedure with information from the “Accounting Standards Followed” 
field in Worldscope as it offers by far the largest sample.  We use a binary variable and code firm-
year observations as IFRS equal to one if Worldscope indicates that the financials are based on 
“International Standards”, “IFRS”, or “IASC guidelines.” Appendix A describes this process in 
more detail and also shows that the Worldscope classification has shortcomings, i.e., does not 
always properly identify firms that claim to follow IFRS.  For this reason, we attempt to manually 
verify the coding of each firm-year observation, for which either Worldscope or Global Vantage 
indicate IFRS reporting, using firms’ annual reports.  Towards this end, we download electronic 
copies of the annual reports from Thomson Research, read the relevant parts in the annual report 
(e.g., accounting principles’ footnote and auditors’ report), and create a hand-coded classification.  
In total, we are able to obtain and code 22,213 annual reports.  We use this extensive hand-coded 
classification together with the accounting standard information in Global Vantage to triangulate 
and correct the initial coding based on Worldscope.  This procedure gives rise to an “augmented” 
Worldscope IFRS classification.13
Table 1 presents the distribution of IFRS and local GAAP firms in the sample by country 
(Panel A) and by year (Panel B).  The total sample consists of 73,575 firm-year observations 
across 24 countries, of which 5,306 are coded as IFRS.  The countries with the highest adoption 
rates are Hungary, Switzerland, and Italy.  Germany has the largest number of IFRS firm-year 
                                                 
13  As Appendix A illustrates, there is a substantial number of cases where the annual report and the Worldscope 
(or Global Vantage) coding do not coincide.  In section 4, we report sensitivity tests that use the original 
Worldscope classification, the classification provided by Global Vantage, and the hand-coded classification 
based on the sub-sample for which we are able to download and check annual reports. 
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observations followed by Switzerland and China.  As expected, the number and the percentage of 
firms reporting under IFRS increases considerably over the sample period.  By 2004, almost 10% 
of the sample firms have adopted some form of IFRS reporting.  Similarly, the number of U.S. 
GAAP firms, which we identify via the same procedure as the IFRS firms, increases over time, 
but the total number remains relatively small. 
Next, we use four criteria to separate IFRS firms into serious and label adopters.  These binary 
partitions are the key research design innovation of our paper.  They describe either changes or 
cross-sectional differences in firms’ reporting behavior or incentives around IFRS adoptions.  We 
use alternative (and very different) partitions because each of them has its advantages and 
shortcomings.  However, finding similar results across partitions should increase the confidence 
in the results and in our inferences. 
Our first partition is based on the idea that IFRS reporting and a serious commitment to 
transparency should increase the quantity of disclosures that firms make in their annual reports.  
We obtain the number of pages of firms’ annual reports from Thomson Research, either by 
downloading the annual report or by pulling the page numbers from the website that lists all 
available annual reports for a given firm.  A firm may provide more than one version of its annual 
report in a given year (e.g., abridged versions or one report in its local language and a second 
report in English).  We attempt to download and use the page numbers of the English version.  If 
an English version is not available, we collect the page numbers of the local-language report.  In 
case Thomson Research lists more than one annual report for a given firm and year, we calculate 
the mean number of pages over all annual reports posted for that year.14  We define a firm as a 
                                                 
14  As a robustness check, we also use the minimum and the maximum page numbers in a given year, resulting in 
very similar partitions. 
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serious IFRS adopter if it exhibits a sustained increase in the page numbers around the IFRS 
adoption year.  That is, we compute the mean page number for the adoption year and the two 
years thereafter (years t, t+1, and t+2) and compare this number to the mean number of pages in 
the two years before the adoption (years t-1 and t-2).  If the mean number of pages post-adoption 
is larger than the mean number of pages pre-adoption, we code this firm as serious. 
Our second partition of serious and label adopters is based on the “International Accounting 
Standards Surveys” published in 1999 and 2000 by David Cairns, a former Secretary-General of 
the IASC and leading authority in international accounting.  In his two surveys, Cairns examines 
firms’ annual reports and classifies their approaches to IAS adoption.  In addition, he assesses the 
extent to which firms comply with IAS using eleven categories ranging from (1) “full IAS 
compliance” (top category) to (11) “unqualified descriptions of differences from IAS treatments” 
(lowest category).  We classify a firm as a serious adopter if it belongs to the first two compliance 
categories (i.e., “full IAS compliance”, “full IAS compliance with exceptions specified in the 
accounting policies”) and as label adopter if the firm is in lower compliance categories. 
Our third classification is based on a change in firms’ earnings quality around IFRS adoption.  
We rely on a simple characterization suggested by Leuz et al. (2003), i.e., the magnitude of 
accruals relative to the cash flow from operations, which is widely available and can be computed 
in changes.  Sloan (1996), Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Richardson et al. (2002) show that the 
decomposition of earnings into accruals and operating cash flow as well as extreme accruals 
contain important information (e.g., with respect to future restatements and SEC enforcement 
actions).  Furthermore, the magnitude of accruals to the cash flow from operations produces 
plausible earnings management rankings for firms around the world (Leuz et al., 2003; Wysocki, 
2004).  Based on this prior work, we expect firms that make serious changes to their reporting 
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policies around the adoption of IFRS to exhibit a decrease in the magnitude of extreme accruals, 
especially relative to label adopters.15
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we compute the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the 
absolute value of cash flows, which captures extreme accruals.  Scaling by the operating cash 
flow serves as a performance adjustment, which is important in identifying earnings management 
because firms with more extreme performance tend to have more extreme accruals absent any 
earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005).  If Worldscope provides cash flow information, we 
estimate accruals as the difference between net income before extraordinary items and the cash 
flow from operations (roughly 55% of the sample).  For the remaining firms, we estimate accruals 
using the indirect method as in Dechow et al. (1995), where cash flow is computed as the 
difference between net income before extraordinary items and working capital accruals plus 
depreciation.  To obtain firm-level measures, we compute a rolling mean over the past 4 years 
(see also Leuz, 2006).  We then compare the mean ratio one year before IFRS adoption with the 
mean ratio three years after the adoption (to ensure that the measure is computed using only post-
adoption years).  Finally, we classify a firm as a serious IFRS adopter if it exhibits a decline in the 
magnitude of accruals after the adoption of IFRS (coded as ‘1’). 
Our fourth partition is built on the idea that firms’ reporting incentives largely determine the 
quality of reported numbers, rather than the standards themselves (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 
2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006).  Based on this logic, firms with 
strong reporting incentives are more likely to adopt IFRS in a way that entails material changes to 
their reporting policies whereas firms with weak reporting incentives are more likely to adopt 
                                                 
15  We realize that the change in accounting standards likely has a mechanical effect on the magnitude of accruals.  
However, as IFRS tends to be more accruals-based than local standards around the world (e.g., Hung, 2001; 
Ding et al., 2006), this effect likely works against our expectations. 
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IFRS as a label.  Relying on economic theory and accounting research over the past two decades, 
we posit that firms that are larger, more profitable, more international, have larger financing 
needs, larger growth opportunities, and more dispersed ownership structures are likely to have 
stronger incentives to provide accounting reports that are informative to outside investors.  We 
use these observable firm characteristics in a factor analysis to create a summary proxy for firms’ 
reporting incentives.  Specifically, we estimate the first principal factor using firm size (measured 
as the natural logarithm of the market value in US$), financial leverage (measured as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets), profitability (measured as return on assets), growth opportunities 
(measured as the logarithm of Tobin’s Q), ownership concentration (measured as the percentage 
of closely held shares), and the percentage of foreign sales (measured as foreign sales divided by 
total sales).  The factor solution retains four factors.  For all variables, except leverage, the first 
and primary factor exhibits the loadings that are expected for firms’ reporting incentives.  That is, 
it is increasing in size, profitability, growth and foreign sales and decreasing in ownership 
concentration; the factor loading for leverage is close to zero.  We extract the factor score for each 
firm-year observation and then compute a time-series average by firm.  We classify a firm as 
serious adopter (coded as ‘1’) if the factor score is above the median factor score for all IFRS 
adopters and as label adopter otherwise. 
It is important to note that the construction of this partition (as well as the Cairns partition) is 
built on cross-sectional differences in firms’ reporting incentives.  It explicitly allows for the 
possibility that a firm with strong reporting incentives provides high-quality reports under local 
GAAP and IFRS, and does not require a change in reporting incentives around IFRS adoption in 
order to classify the firm as a serious adopter.  In contrast, the partitions based on page numbers 
or earnings quality changes would classify these no-change firms as label adopters.  For this 
reason, we view our changes and cross-sectional partitions as complementary analyses. 
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3.2 Dependent Variables 
In studying the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions, we use proxies for information 
asymmetry, market liquidity, and the cost of capital.  Increasing the commitment to transparency 
should reduce information asymmetries between investors and increase market liquidity (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 2001).  Similarly, more precise disclosures should lower estimation risk, which in 
turn reduces the cost of capital if part of the estimation risk is non-diversifiable (e.g., Barry and 
Brown, 1985; Coles et al., 1995; Lambert et al., 2007a).  In addition, more disclosure can improve 
risk sharing in the economy and again lower firms’ cost of capital (e.g., Merton, 1987; Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert et al., 2007b).  Thus, proxies for the cost of capital, information 
asymmetry and market liquidity should reflect, among other things, the quality of disclosures and 
financial reports.  In addition, market-based proxies should capture differences in reporting 
quality more broadly, including differences in recognition, measurement and footnote disclosures. 
As our first proxy, we use the implied cost of equity capital.  Following Hail and Leuz 
(2006a), we compute estimates of the implied cost of capital using four models suggested in the 
literature (Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth, 2005).  All four models are consistent with discounted dividend valuation but rely on 
different earnings-based representations of this model.  For each model, we substitute market 
price and analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S into the valuation equation and back out the cost of 
capital as the internal rate of return that equates current stock price and the expected future 
sequence of residual incomes or abnormal earnings.  We average over the four models to obtain a 
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single estimate per firm-year observation.  Appendix B describes the models and the cost of 
capital estimation in more detail.16
The second dependent variable is the bid-ask spread, which is a commonly used proxy for 
information asymmetry (e.g., Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  We 
obtain the closing bid and ask prices for each day from Datastream and compute the daily quoted 
spread as the difference between the two prices divided by the mid-point.  To obtain a yearly 
firm-year observation, we compute the median daily spread over the year. 
The third dependent variable is a measure of illiquidity suggested by Amihud (2002), which 
in turn is inspired by Kyle’s (1985) lambda.  The proxy is intended to capture the price impact of 
trades, i.e., the ability of an investor to trade in stock without moving its price.17  We measure 
illiquidity as the median daily price impact over the year and follow Amihud (2002) in computing 
price impact as the daily absolute price change per dollar of trading volume. 
All dependent variables are measured as of month +10 after the fiscal year end for which we 
code the accounting standards.  We choose this month to ensure that firms’ annual reports are 
publicly available and priced at the time of our computations (Hail and Leuz, 2006a).  For 
variables that are computed over an entire year, we start the computation as of month -2 through 
month +10 relative to the firm’s fiscal year end. 
Table 2, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables for the sample of 
IFRS adopters and firms following local GAAP.  The mean cost of capital for firms following 
                                                 
16  We recognize that there is a debate about the empirical validity of implied cost of capital estimates (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2005; Easton and Monahan, 2005; Guay et al., 2005; Pastor et al., 2006).  One alternative is to use 
realized returns as a proxy for expected returns.  However, this proxy has many drawbacks as well, especially 
with short time series (Elton, 1999).  We therefore go down a different route and use proxies for liquidity and 
information asymmetry as these constructs also capture differences in reporting quality (Leuz, 2003). 
17  While market liquidity is an important construct in its own right, there is also evidence that illiquidity is priced 
in expected returns (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). 
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local GAAP is 12.7% compared to a cost of capital of 12.1% for IFRS adopters.  Likewise, the 
mean spread (mean illiquidity) for local GAAP firms is 3.7% (18.75) versus 1.8% (11.30) for 
IFRS adopters.18 Taken at face value, these results suggest that IFRS firms have lower cost of 
capital and higher market liquidity than local GAAP firms.  However, these comparisons do not 
control for differences in firm characteristics and are provided for descriptive purposes only. 
3.3 Control Variables 
In all regression models, we include industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects.  Thus, our 
specifications control for differences in countries’ adoption rates as well as time trends in IFRS 
adoption.  In unreported regressions, we also check that our results are robust when we include 
country-year-fixed effects to control for country-wide shifts in the adoption rates over time, e.g., 
due to the announcement of mandatory IFRS reporting.  Thus, our IFRS effects are identified via 
within-country differences relative to local GAAP firms and label adopters, respectively. 
In addition, we introduce binary indicator variables to control for firms following U.S. GAAP, 
having U.S. cross-listings, trading on a “new market”, and being a member of a major index.  We 
identify firms with a U.S. cross-listing, i.e., with shares traded over-the-counter or listed on an 
exchange in the U.S., and code them separately from the voluntary U.S. GAAP firms without 
cross-listings.  We control for “new market” firms if their shares are traded on an exchange 
specializing in technology and other high-growth stocks and with listing requirements that 
mandate or allow for IFRS reporting, i.e., Bovespa Novo Mercado (Brazil), Expandi market 
(Italy), Neuer Markt (Germany), Nordic Growth Market (Sweden), and Sesdaq (Singapore).  
                                                 
18  We note that spread and illiquidity are right-skewed.  As it is common in the literature to estimate micro-
structure models in a log-linear specification, we use the natural logarithm of these measures, which also 
addresses the skewness. 
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Index observations represent firms whose shares are constituents of national or international stock 
market indices as defined in Worldscope. 
For the cost-of-capital specifications, we follow Hail and Leuz (2006b) and control for 
expected inflation, firm size, financial leverage, return variability, and forecast bias.  We control 
for inflation because analyst forecasts are expressed in nominal terms and local currency, which 
implies that the resulting cost of capital estimates reflect countries’ expected inflation rates.  
Inflation is measured as the yearly median of country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly 
inflation rates.19  Size is measured as total assets, leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets, and return variability is the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns computed 
from month -2 through month +10 relative to the firm’s fiscal year end.  Finally, we control for 
analyst forecast errors for two reasons.  First, it is possible that the adoption of IFRS impairs 
analysts’ ability to forecast earnings, at least during a transitional period.  Second, any bias in 
analyst forecasts could mechanically affect our implied cost of capital estimate if markets back 
out the bias.  We compute forecast bias as the one-year-ahead I/B/E/S analyst forecast error 
(mean forecast minus actual) scaled by lagged total assets.  
In the spread and illiquidity regressions, we control for firm size, return variability, and share 
turnover (Chordia et al., 2000).  Firm size is the market value of equity measured as the stock 
price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ millions).  Return variability is computed as 
annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns.  Share turnover is the accumulated US$ 
trading volume during the year divided by market value of outstanding equity.  Again, we 
compute return variability and share turnover beginning in month -2 through month +10 relative 
                                                 
19  Using countries’ risk-free rates, rather than the inflation rate, yields very similar results and inferences. 
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to a firms’s fiscal year end, and lag the market variables by one year to mitigate any confounding 
effects from contemporaneous measurement. 
Table 2, Panel B, presents descriptive statistics on the control variables for the sample of 
IFRS adopters and for firms following local GAAP.  Firms adopting IFRS are on average much 
larger, more financially leveraged, have lower analyst forecast bias, share volatility and turnover. 
4. Results 
4.1 The Average Effects of IFRS Reporting 
We begin our analysis by examining the average effect of IFRS adoption on firms’ cost of 
capital and market liquidity.  We use cross-sectional, time-series panel regressions, which 
essentially benchmark IFRS firms against local GAAP firms and against the local GAAP history 
of IFRS adopters.  Estimating the average effects allows us to compare our findings to prior work. 
Towards this end, we estimate the empirical specification outlined in equation (1), but without 
including the serious IFRS adopter variable.  In addition, we estimate a model including a dummy 
variable coded as ‘1’ if the firm adopts IFRS at any point in time.  This IFRS firm-fixed effect 
allows us to control for time-invariant and potentially unobserved differences between voluntary 
IFRS adopters and local GAAP firms.  In this model, the IFRS variable is estimated from firms 
with reporting changes only.  We report results from OLS regressions with robust standard errors 
that are clustered by firm. 
Table 3 presents the average effect of IFRS adoptions on the cost of capital, bid-ask spreads 
and stock illiquidity.  In the first two regressions, the coefficients on the IFRS adoption variable 
are positive but insignificant, suggesting that IFRS firms do not have a lower cost of capital than 
local GAAP firms.  Comparing this finding to the univariate analysis in Table 2 illustrates the 
importance of controlling for firm characteristics.  It is also in contrast to findings by Barth et al. 
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(2006) suggesting a decrease in expected returns around IFRS adoptions.  The inclusion of an 
IFRS firm-fixed effect does not change the IFRS coefficient, indicating that the estimated effect is 
not driven by time-invariant differences across IFRS and local GAAP firms.  Consistent with Hail 
and Leuz (2006b), the coefficients on U.S. listing indicate that being cross-listed in the U.S. 
significantly lowers firms’ cost of capital (by about 50 basis points).  There are also significant 
cost-of-capital differentials for firms on new markets and for firms that are members of a major 
stock index.20  All continuous control variables are highly significant and have the expected signs. 
The next two columns in Table 3 present the results for the bid-ask spreads.  Model 1 suggests 
that firms reporting under IFRS have significantly higher bid-ask spreads.  However, once we 
include the IFRS firm indicator, this effect disappears and the coefficient becomes negative, 
suggesting that the positive IFRS coefficient in Model 1 reflects differences between IFRS and 
local GAAP firms, rather than an adoption effect.21  However, the decline in the spread is 
insignificant.  Again, the indicators for new market firms and firms with stock index memberships 
are significant, suggesting that it is important to control for their effects.  The coefficients on 
market value, share turnover, and return variability are all highly significant and exhibit the 
predicted relations. 
The final two columns in Table 3 report the results for share illiquidity.  The tenor and pattern 
of the illiquidity findings are similar to those using spreads.  That is, the coefficient on IFRS is 
significantly positive in Model 1 but loses its significance after we include the IFRS firm 
                                                 
20  The magnitude of the new market effect, when compared to the effect of cross-listing, is perhaps surprising.  
One potential explanation for this finding is that the variable indicates high-tech stocks which in retrospect were 
overpriced for some time of our sample period (relative to the rest of the market).  This, in turn, should bias the 
implied cost of capital estimates downward. 
21  This finding is broadly consistent with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000).  They show that it is important to control 
for selection effects and find a significantly negative effect on spreads after attempting to account for self-
selection. 
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indicator.  The findings for all other control variables are very similar to the spread regressions, 
except for the coefficient on U.S. listing, which now not only has the expected sign but it is also 
significant. 
Overall, the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions are either insignificant or disguised by 
substantial heterogeneity across firms, in which case examining the average effect is potentially 
misleading.  Regardless, our findings for the average IFRS effect are inconsistent with the notion 
that IFRS itself and hence for all voluntary adoptions constitutes a commitment to increased 
disclosure.  However, this is not surprising in light of our argument that firms have substantial 
flexibility in how they adopt IFRS.  The findings are also consistent with prior evidence on the 
role of firms’ reporting incentives, suggesting that standard choices themselves are of lesser 
importance (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
4.2 Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences across Serious and Label IFRS Adopters 
In this section, we examine the effects of IFRS adoption on the cost of capital, bid-ask spread, 
and stock illiquidity across serious and label IFRS adopters.  If the market and our four 
partitioning variables are able to differentiate between serious and label adopters, we expect to 
find a decrease in the cost of capital, spread, and illiquidity for serious IFRS adopters relative to 
label adopters.  To the extent that serious IFRS adopters commit to more transparency, we also 
expect them to have a lower cost of capital and higher market liquidity than local GAAP firms.  
However, this prediction hinges critically on our partitioning variables.  That is, the better our 
partitioning variables capture material changes in firms’ reporting strategies or cross-sectional 
differences in their commitment to transparency, the more likely it is that we see a reduction in 
the cost of capital and an increase in liquidity.  We have no prediction with regard to the 
difference between label adopters and local GAAP firms.  One possibility is that the switch to the 
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new accounting regime changes only the name of the standards and hence does not result in any 
capital-market effects.  On the other hand, market participants could perceive label adoptions as a 
negative signal, in which case we could even observe an increase in the capital-market proxies. 
We start our cross-sectional analyses with univariate comparisons across the two types of 
IFRS adopters and firms reporting under local GAAP.  Next, we present OLS regression results 
from estimating equation (1) with robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.  Table 4 
reports median values and numbers of observations for the dependent variables across label and 
serious IFRS adopters, and local GAAP firms.  As Panel A shows, cost of capital for serious IFRS 
adopters is lowest and, in most cases, statistically different from the other cells for each 
partitioning variable.  Compared to label adopters, differences in the cost of capital range from 10 
basis points using the magnitude of accruals partition up to 230 basis points when splitting by the 
reporting incentives factor.  The results of comparing label adopters to local GAAP firms are 
inconclusive.  Panels B and C repeat the analyses for the bid-ask spread and stock illiquidity.  
IFRS firms exhibit lower spreads and are more liquid than their local GAAP peers.  Moreover, the 
decrease in the bid-ask spread and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure is larger for serious IFRS 
adopters then for label adopters.  In all cases, the differences are highly significant.  Thus, in sum, 
the univariate analyses provide a first clue that investors are able to distinguish between different 
IFRS adopters and that firms that make serious changes to their reporting policies around IFRS 
adoptions experience larger economic benefits than firms that adopt IFRS as a label.  However, as 
these analyses do not control for other firm characteristics, they should be interpreted cautiously. 
Table 5 presents results from multiple regression analyses.  Our main variable of interest is 
the indicator variable for serious IFRS adopters, which we predict to take on a negative sign.  
This variable measures the differential effect on the outcome variables between serious and label 
 26
adopters, after controlling for various firm characteristics as well as industry-, country- and year-
fixed effects.  The IFRS variable captures the effect on the outcome variables for the label 
adopters.  The two coefficients combined compare serious IFRS adopters to local GAAP firms. 
In Panel A, we report the cost of capital results.  We find that all four partitions point in the 
predicted direction and that, in three out of four partitions, serious adopters exhibit a significant 
decrease in cost of capital relative to label adopters.  In two cases, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on serious IFRS adopters exceeds the IFRS coefficient by a few basis points, 
consistent with a small cost of capital benefit for serious adopters relative to local GAAP firms.  
But the effect is only significant using the reporting incentives factor.  Further, the IFRS adoption 
coefficient is always positive and, in three out four partitions, it is statistically significant.  This 
result implies that the positive IFRS coefficients documented in Table 3 stem primarily from 
firms classified as label adopters, highlighting the substantial heterogeneity in the effects.  The 
coefficients on the control variables are very similar to those presented earlier.  Thus, in sum, 
markets appear to be able to distinguish between label and serious adopters and set the cost of 
capital accordingly. 
Panel B presents the results for bid-ask spreads.  The coefficients on serious IFRS adopters 
are negative for all partitions.  Furthermore, they are significant in three cases and close to 
conventional significance levels for the page numbers partition.  These results suggest that serious 
adopters experience a significant decline in bid-ask spreads relative to label adopters.  The effect 
relative to local GAAP firms is negative in all four cases, but only statistically significant in two 
cases.  For label adopters the results are mixed.  The effect is positive in three out of four 
partitions, but only significant for the reporting incentives factor.  For the Cairns report partition, 
label adopters exhibit even a significant decrease in bid-ask spreads. 
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In Panel C, we report the results for stock illiquidity.  The coefficient on the serious adopter 
indicator is again always negative and statistically significant in two cases.  This finding suggests 
that serious IFRS adopters experience larger declines in their share illiquidity than label adopters.  
When compared to firms reporting under local GAAP, the net effect of the serious IFRS adoption 
is negative in three cases and statistically significant in two.  Further, the IFRS adoption variable 
is significantly positive in the magnitude of accruals and the reporting factor partitions indicating 
that label adopters may experience higher illiquidity levels after adopting IFRS.  For both, spreads 
and illiquidity, the control variables exhibit associations that are similar to those in Table 3. 
In sum, these findings confirm our main hypothesis that there is substantial heterogeneity in 
the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions and that these differences are in part explained by 
the degree to which firms make substantial changes to their reporting policies and have strong 
reporting incentives.  This evidence casts doubt on the interpretation of the capital-market effects 
as stemming from IFRS adoption per se.  Finally, the findings suggest that markets can 
successfully distinguish between different adoption types and they reward firms that commit to 
more transparency. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the above results to two critical research design 
choices.  First, to gauge the effect of sample selection, we estimate the multiple regressions using 
only firm-year observations from IFRS adopter firms or using a matched-sample approach.  In the 
latter case, we select for each IFRS firm and based on its adoption year (or, if not available, the 
earliest year it enters our sample) a firm that is ranging closest in market value of equity and is 
from the same industry and country.  Both alternative samples yield results that are very similar to 
 28
those reported in the tables, and if anything, the results for serious IFRS adopters become 
stronger, i.e., the coefficients of interest are even more negative. 
Second, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the accounting standards classification.  
As explained above and in Appendix A, we use an augmented Worldscope accounting standards 
classification that incorporates extensive hand-coding of firms’ annual reports.  As a robustness 
check, we re-run our analyses using (1) the original Worldscope classification, (2) the accounting 
standards classification based on Global Vantage, and (3) the sub-sample of firms for which we 
are able to classify standards based on firms’ annual reports.  These analyses allow us to gauge 
the sensitivity of our findings to the accounting standards classification used. 
The original Worldscope classification produces results that are quite similar and consistent 
with those reported in the tables.  Results based on the Global Vantage classification are 
qualitatively similar, but usually weaker, which appears to be mainly due to the substantial 
decrease in IFRS observations identified by Global Vantage.  Similar issues arise for the hand-
coded sample.  However, the basic message – serious adopters experience different economic 
consequences than label adopters – is the same across the three classifications.22  For instance, the 
difference between serious and label IFRS adopters in the cost of capital regressions range from -
23 to -99 basis points for the Worldscope classification, from -46 to -96 basis points for the 
Global Vantage classification, and from -11 to -72 basis points for the sample of hand-collected 
information.  We obtain similar inferences when using spreads and the illiquidity variable. 
                                                 
22  This finding may seem surprising in light of the differences across classifications documented in Appendix A.  
Note, however, that our label/serious partitions are in principle independent of the accounting standards 
classification (except for the Cairns partition).  Thus, if our partitions work and (appropriately) put local GAAP 
firms that are misclassified as IFRS into the label category, misclassifications do not necessarily hurt our tests. 
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Taken together, the results from these robustness tests suggest that serious IFRS adopters have 
lower costs of capital, lower information asymmetry, and more liquid stocks than label adopters.  
The results are robust to alternative research designs and are consistent across alternative 
accounting standards classifications. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the economic consequences of voluntary IFRS adoptions around the 
world.  In contrast to prior work, we focus on the heterogeneity in the consequences, recognizing 
that firms have considerable discretion in how they adopt IFRS.  Some firms may adopt IFRS 
merely as a label without making material changes to their reporting policies, while others may 
view the decision as a serious commitment to transparency.  Consistent with this expectation, we 
document that the economic consequences of IFRS adoptions depend on the extent to which firms 
make material changes to their reporting policies or have strong reporting incentives. 
To illustrate the heterogeneity in the adoption effects, we create four binary partitions that 
attempt to identify serious and label adopters.  The first measure is based on the idea that IFRS 
adoption as part of a serious commitment to more transparency should increase the quantity of 
disclosures that firms make in their annual reports.  We therefore classify firms based on changes 
in the page numbers of the annual reports around the adoption of IFRS.  The second measure 
relies on two surveys by Cairns (1999, 2000) that analyze and categorize annual reports of 290 
firms in terms of their compliance with IAS.  The third proxy is based on a simple 
characterization of firms’ earnings quality, i.e., the magnitude of accruals relative to the cash flow 
from operations, and compares changes in this metric around IFRS adoptions.  The fourth 
measure is built on the idea that high-quality reporting depends on firms’ reporting incentives.  
Firms with strong reporting incentives are more likely to adopt IFRS in a way that entails material 
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changes to their reporting policies whereas firms with weak reporting incentives are more likely 
to adopt IFRS as a label.  We characterize firms’ reporting incentives using a factor analysis of 
various firm characteristics. 
Our sample consists of a large panel of IFRS adoptions from 1988 to 2004 across 24 
countries.  This dataset is constructed from Worldscope and by extensive hand-coding of annual 
reports.  To capture the economic consequences of IFRS adoption, we use three different proxies 
for firms’ cost of capital and market liquidity.  Our analysis proceeds in two steps.  First, we 
analyze whether IFRS firms on average exhibit a lower cost of capital and higher market liquidity 
than local GAAP firms.  Next, we split the sample of IFRS firms using the four partitions and 
examine whether the consequences differ across serious and label adopters. 
On average, we find little evidence that IFRS adoptions are associated with a significant 
decline in the cost of capital or an increase in market liquidity, after controlling for known 
determinants of these measures.  This evidence is inconsistent with the notion that IFRS itself and 
hence for all voluntary adoptions constitutes a commitment to increased disclosure.  But it should 
not be surprising in light of the substantial flexibility that firms have in how they adopt IFRS. 
Consistent with this flexibility and our main hypothesis, we find substantial differences in the 
economic consequences after partitioning the sample into serious and label adopters.  
Specifically, we find that serious IFRS adopters experience economically and statistically 
significant declines in the cost of capital and increases in market liquidity relative to label 
adopters.  When compared to firms reporting under local GAAP, we find that the effects are much 
more modest, implying that markets react adversely to label adoptions. 
These findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the heterogeneity in the economic 
consequences of IFRS adoptions.  By documenting that the effects differ with firms’ reporting 
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incentives and the extent to which firms make serious changes to their reporting strategies, we 
show that one has to exercise caution in attributing the effects (and prior findings) to IFRS 
reporting per se.  In addition, our study shows that markets can differentiate between different 
adoption strategies.  This result is important as there is considerable concern that the global 
movement towards a single set of accounting standards masks the heterogeneity in actual 
reporting practices and hence makes it harder for investors to evaluate firms’ reporting quality. 
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Appendix A: IFRS and Financial Reporting Standards Classifications 
This appendix describes our coding of firm-year observations from firms following IFRS, 
U.S. GAAP or local GAAP, and compares accounting standards classifications across different 
data sources.  We use three primary data sources to construct our panel of firms’ accounting 
standards: (1) Thomson Financial Worldscope (WS), (2) Compustat Global Vantage (GV), and 
(3) a comprehensive manual review of firms’ annual reports collected through Thomson 
Research.  WS serves as starting point for our coding procedure because its coverage is by far the 
most comprehensive.  In addition, it is directly linked to Datastream thereby reducing the 
potential for mismatches from combining accounting data with price data.  Using the WS 
information on accounting standards followed (Field 07536), we classify firm-year observations 
into the three categories IFRS, U.S. GAAP and local GAAP according to Panel A of Table A1.  
For sensitivity purposes and to assess the quality of commercially available databases, we also 
classify the same set of observations applying the GV coding scheme in Panel B that is based on 
the accounting standards information in GV field “ASTD”.23
To check whether the information contained in WS (and, consequently, GV) meets our 
purposes (i.e., identification of firms claiming to report under IFRS), we next conduct an 
extensive manual data collection and classification.  In a first step, we identify all potential 
voluntary IFRS or U.S. GAAP adopters, i.e., firms with at least one firm-year coded as IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP in either WS or GV before IFRS adoption became mandatory (35,633 firm-years).  
We then attempt to gather the time-series of annual reports through Thomson Research and were 
                                                 
23 One of the drawbacks of commercial databases for our study is that they attempt to capture many different 
reporting practices around the world, but often at the expense of consistency through time or across countries.  
Furthermore, the categories often do not provide clear distinctions between local GAAP and IFRS, as is needed 
for our study.  For instance, category 02 “International standards” in WS comprises not only IFRS observations, 
but also firms following other non-local, non-U.S. standards (e.g., H.K. GAAP, U.K. GAAP).  This problem is 
even more pronounced in GV as it has only three categories dedicated to international standards. 
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able to collect 22,213 documents in electronic image format.  Next, based on an extensive manual 
review of the accounting principles’ footnote and the auditors’ report, we create our own 
accounting standards classification (Panel C).  The idea behind this classification is to rely on 
firms’ self-proclaimed financial reporting practices.  This leads to six IFRS (U.S. GAAP) 
reporting categories ranging from the exclusive use of IFRS (U.S. GAAP) for consolidated 
financial statements to reporting under local GAAP together with a reconciliation of net income 
or shareholders’ equity to IFRS (U.S. GAAP).  Note that we classify firms as local when they 
only adopt individual IFRS or U.S. GAAP standards (e.g., for leasing or segment reporting).  
Finally, we complete firms’ time-series by filling in cases with missing individual annual reports 
utilizing all data sources at hand (i.e. WS, GV, annual reports).  This procedure results in a total 
hand-coded sample of 27,589 firm-year observations. 
The main purpose of this massive hand-collection is to assess the suitability of commercially 
available databases for our research question.  To gauge the effect of potential misclassifications, 
we tabulate firm-years across different classification schemes and report the number of 
observations and percentages in Table A2.  For ease of comparison, we use the base sample from 
our main analyses (n=73,575).24  In Panel A we compare the classifications across WS and GV.  
For our comprehensive coding for IFRS, we find that 3.8% of all firm-year observations are 
classified as IFRS in WS, but as local GAAP in GV (compared to 1.2% the other way round).  
Thus, the two data sources provide contradicting information on more than every second IFRS 
firm-year observation.  When we limit the WS coding to categories 02 and 23 and the GV coding 
to “DI” (labeled “Stricter Coding for IFRS” in Panel A), the contradiction rate drops to about 
46%.  Note that firm coverage in WS is larger by about one third compared to GV.  Panel B 
                                                 
24  In unreported analyses we confirm that the results of the cross-tabulation is very similar when using the entire 
hand-coded sample instead (n=27,589). 
 34
reports results from comparing the hand-coded classification to WS and GV.  Although none of 
the two commercial databases clearly dominates, the degree of overlap with WS is 12.4% (i.e., 
the sum of the main diagonal, i.e., 5.1% + 1.2% + 5.1%) of the observations compared to 9.8% (= 
3.6% + 0.8% + 5.4%) with GV.  In addition, our IFRS hand-coding disagrees in 42% (40%) of 
the cases with WS (GV).  Panel C reports Pearson correlations between the three classifications. 
As a further validity check we compare the three coding schemes on a country-by-country 
basis.  In Table A3 we tabulate the numbers and proportions of IFRS and U.S. GAAP adopters for 
all countries with a minimum of 20 firm-year observations and total assets available.  The table 
again highlights the larger firm coverage in WS, which identifies more than twice as many IFRS 
observations than GV (13,001 IFRS firm-years versus 6,227).  The hand-coded sample consists of 
8,399 IFRS firm-year observations.  It further reveals that the proportion of IFRS adopters at the 
individual country-level varies substantially.  For instance, the percentage of IFRS adopters in 
Italy is as high as 78.7% according to WS compared to 0.2% based on GV.  The hand-coding, 
where observations uniformly classified as local under WS and GV serve as benchmark, produces 
a proportion of 25%.  Overall, the country-level comparison confirms the existence of substantial 
inconsistencies across commercially available data providers. 
As a result of the above validity checks, we conduct our main analyses using an augmented 
WS accounting standards classification where our hand-coded data overrides conflicting WS 
information.  This yields 3,183 substitutions.  For completeness, we also report results using 
alternative accounting standards classifications in the sensitivity tests section.25
                                                 
25  Note that some of our analyses require the identification of an adoption year.  We define the IFRS adoption year 
as the first incidence that satisfies the following criteria: (1) at least two consecutive firm-year observations are 
available for a particular firm, and (2) the second (but not the first) of those consecutive years must be classified 
as reporting under IFRS. 
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Appendix B: Implied Cost of Equity Capital Models 
B.1 Overview and Model-specific Assumptions 
Claus and Thomas (2001): 
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Model-specific assumptions: 
This is a special case of the residual income valuation model. It uses actual book values per share and forecasted 
earnings per share up to five years ahead to derive the expected future residual income series. We define residual 
income as forecasted earnings per share less a cost of capital charge for beginning of fiscal year book value of equity 
per share. We assume clean surplus, i.e., future book values are imputed from current book values, forecasted 
earnings and dividends. Dividends are set equal to a constant fraction of forecasted earnings. At time T = 5, it is 
assumed that (nominal) residual income grows at rate g equal to the expected inflation. As a proxy for g, we use the 
(annualized) median of country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates. Note that g sets a lower 
bound to the cost of capital estimates. 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001): 
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Model-specific assumptions: 
This is a special case of the residual income valuation model. It uses actual book values per share and forecasted 
earnings per share up to three years ahead to impute future expected residual income for an initial three-year period. 
We assume clean surplus, i.e., future book values are imputed from current book values, forecasted earnings and 
dividends. Dividends are set equal to a constant fraction of forecasted earnings. After the explicit forecast period of 
three years, the residual income series is derived by linearly fading the forecasted accounting return on equity to the 
industry-specific median return. We compute the historic three-year average return on equity in a given country and 
year based on the industry classification in Campbell (1996). Negative yearly target returns are replaced by country-
industry medians. From T = 12 on residual income is assumed to remain constant. 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005): 
 Pt = ˆ x t+1 rOJ( )⋅ gst + rOJ ⋅ ˆ d t+1 ˆ x t+1 − glt( ) rOJ − glt( ) 
Model-specific assumptions: 
This is a special case of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005). It uses one-year ahead forecasted earnings and dividends per share as well as forecasts of short-term and 
long-term abnormal earnings growth. Dividends are set equal to a constant fraction of forecasted earnings. 
Following Gode and Mohanram (2003), the short-term growth rate gst is estimated as the average between the 
forecasted percentage change in earnings from year t+1 to t+2 and the five-year growth forecast provided by 
financial analysts on I/B/E/S. The model requires a positive change in forecasted earnings to yield a numerical 
solution. The long-term earnings growth rate glt incorporates the assumption that growth in abnormal earnings per 
share beyond year t+1 equals the expected rate of inflation. We use the (annualized) country-specific median of one-
year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates. Note that glt sets a lower bound to the cost of capital estimates. 
Modified PEG ratio model by Easton (2004): 
 Pt = ˆ x t+2 + rPEG ⋅ ˆ d t+1 − ˆ x t+1( ) rPEG2  
Model-specific assumptions: 
This is a special case of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005). It uses one-year ahead and two-year ahead earnings per share forecasts as well as expected dividends per 
share in period t+1 to derive a measure of abnormal earnings growth. Dividends are set equal to a constant fraction 
of forecasted earnings. The model embeds the assumption that growth in abnormal earnings persists in perpetuity 
after the initial period. Note that it requires positive changes in forecasted earnings (including re-invested dividends) 
to yield a numerical solution. 
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Notes: 
tP  = Market price of a firm’s stock at date t 
tbv  = Book value per share at the beginning of the fiscal year 
τ+tbv  = Expected future book value per share at date t+τ , where  ττττ ++−++ −+= tttt dxbvbv ˆˆ1
τ+txˆ  = Expected future earnings per share for period (t+τ–1, t+τ) using either explicit analyst 
forecasts or future earnings derived from growth forecasts g, gst, and glt, respectively 
τ+tdˆ  = Expected future net dividends per share for period (t+τ–1, t+τ), derived from the dividend 
payout ratio times the earnings per share forecast  τ+txˆ
ltst ggg ,,  =  Expected (perpetual, short-term or long-term) future growth rate 
PEGOJGLSCT rrrr ,,,  =  Implied cost of capital estimates calculated as the internal rate of return solving the above 
valuation equations, respectively 
B.2 General Assumptions and Data Requirements 
This appendix delineates our computation of the implied cost of capital proxy used as a 
dependent variable in the analyses.  For an observation to be included in the cost of capital sample 
we require current stock price data (Pt), analyst earnings per share forecasts for two periods ahead 
( ˆ x t+1 and ˆ x t+2), and either forecasted earnings per share for period t+3 ( ˆ x t+3) or an estimate of 
long-term earnings growth (ltg).  We obtain this information from the I/B/E/S database.  If 
explicit earnings per share forecasts for the periods t+3 through t+5 are missing, we apply the 
following relation: .  Alternatively, if long-term growth projections are 
missing, we impute ltg from the percentage change in forecasted earnings per share between 
periods t+2 and t+3.  In our main tests, we use only positive earnings forecasts and growth rates.  
All estimates are mean analyst consensus forecasts. 
ˆ x t+τ = ˆ x t+τ−1 ⋅ 1+ ltg( )
Stock prices and analyst forecasts are measured as of month +10 after the fiscal year end 
(I/B/E/S provides updates as of the third Thursday of each month).  This time lag is chosen to 
ensure that financial data, especially earnings and book values of equity, are publicly available 
and impounded in prices at the time we compute the cost of capital estimate.  However, this 
implies that the one-year ahead forecast ( ˆ xt+1) is for a fiscal year that ends just two months later.  
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Furthermore, the pricing date (Pt’, where t’ refers to month +10) diverges from the equity 
valuation date in the above formulas (Pt, where t refers to the end of the previous fiscal year). 
This misalignment of t’ and t has no effect on the earnings forecasts per se.  In the absence of 
any new information, a US$ 1 earnings per share forecast at the beginning of the fiscal year (t) 
yields the same number just 10 months later (t’).  Prices on the other hand increase as they move 
closer to future expected cash flows, even without new information.  To account for this 
appreciation in price, we discount the month +10 price (Pt’) to the beginning of the fiscal year, 
using the imputed cost of capital, i.e., we use [1+r]-10/12 as discount factor, where r equals rCT, 
rGLS, rOJ and rPEG, respectively.  This adjustment directly yields cost of equity capital estimates on 
an annualized basis, which at the same time reflect the information set available at month +10 
after the fiscal-year end.26
Net dividends ( ˆ d t+τ ) are forecasted up to the finite forecast horizon as a constant fraction of 
expected future earnings per share.  We define the dividend payout ratio (kt) as the historic three-
year average for each firm.  If kt is missing or outside the range of zero and one, we replace it by 
the country-year median payout ratio.  We use the (annualized) country-specific median of one-
year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates as our proxy for long-run growth expectations (g or 
glt) in the terminal value computations.  Negative values are replaced by the country’s historical 
inflation rate, estimated as the median of the monthly inflation rates over the entire sample period, 
because deflation cannot persist forever.  We obtain all financial data (bvt and kt) from the 
Worldscope database.  Inflation data are gathered from the Datastream and Worldbank databases. 
                                                 
26  The described procedure is essentially equivalent to using month +10 prices (Pt’) and discounting the forecasted 
valuation attributes to date t’ (see e.g., Francis, Olsson, and Oswald, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005).  In that 
case, we add a part-year factor of 2/12 to the discount factor, i.e., [1+r]τ-1+2/12, where τ indicates the forecast year 
and r equals rCT, rGLS, rOJ and rPEG, respectively.  In unreported analyses we confirm that this alternative 
adjustment produces very similar cost of capital estimates. 
 38
Since most of the valuation models do not have a closed form solution, we use an iterative 
procedure to determine the internal rate of return.  This numerical approximation identifies the 
annual firm-specific discount rate that equates Pt to the right-hand side of the respective equity 
valuation model.  We stop iterating if the imputed price falls within a 0.001 difference of its 
actual value.  Implied cost of equity capital estimates are restricted to be positive and set to 
missing otherwise. 
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Table 1.  Sample Composition by Country and Year. 
Panel A: Accounting Standards, Listing Status and Index Membership by Country 
   IFRS U.S. GAAP U.S. Listing New Markets Index Member 
 
Country 
Unique 
Firms 
Firm-
Years 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
Australia             1,421 6,641 60 0.9 14 0.2 591 8.9 31 0.5 2,863 43.1
Austria             
             
             
             
             
         
            
             
             
             
          
             
             
             
             
             
            
             
             
            
             
            
             
            
151 1,177 246 20.9 28 2.4 117 9.9 44 3.7 248 21.1
Belgium 186 1,299 113 8.7 10 0.8 27 2.1 0 0.0 346 26.6
Bermuda 27 89 18 20.2 32 36.0 0 0.0 22 24.7 23 25.8
Canada 1,663 9,214 33 0.4 203 2.2 1,290 14.0 2 0.0 3,063 33.2
China 1,359 3,890 856 22.0 18 0.5 132 3.4 3 0.1 128 3.3
Czech Republic 
 
65 221 47 21.3 0 0.0 8 3.6 0 0.0 21 9.5
Denmark 253 2,247 111 4.9 2 0.1 31 1.4 0 0.0 328 14.6
Finland 163 994 41 4.1 8 0.8 31 3.1 3 0.3 261 26.3
France 1,151 7,279 302 4.1 81 1.1 242 3.3 0 0.0 2,756 37.9
Germany 904 3,762 1,051
 
27.9 489 13.0 123 3.3 1,045 27.8 688 18.3
Greece 354 2,305 36 1.6 6 0.3 36 1.6 0 0.0 657 28.5
Hong Kong 920 5,207 89 1.7 10 0.2 615 11.8 69 1.3 1,361 26.1
Hungary 39 238 139 58.4 6 2.5 32 13.4 0 0.0 12 5.0
Israel 174 688 19 2.8 199 28.9 57 8.3 28 4.1 196 28.5
Italy 368 2,319 761 32.8 3 0.1 50 2.2 36 1.6 580 25.0
The Netherlands
 
267 1,755 30 1.7 51 2.9 107 6.1 45 2.6 247 14.1
Portugal 93 366 12 3.3 1 0.3 11 3.0 0 0.0 130 35.5
Singapore 247 1,367 11 0.8 6 0.4 59 4.3 927 67.8 526 38.5
South Africa
 
517 2,723 112 4.1 4 0.1 270 9.9 0 0.0 781 28.7
Sweden 392 2,525 66 2.6 0 0.0 117 4.6 40 1.6 361 14.3
Switzerland
 
308 2,414 953 39.5 43 1.8 56 2.3 13 0.5 385 15.9
Turkey 187 1,085 187 17.2 0 0.0 25 2.3 0 0.0 617 56.9
United Kingdom 2,444 13,770 13 0.1 13 0.1 773 5.6 4 0.0 5,600 40.7
Total 13,653 73,575 5,306 7.2 1,227 1.7 4,800 6.5 2,312 3.1 22,178 30.1
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Accounting Standards, Listing Status and Index Membership by Year 
  
       
IFRS 
 
U.S. GAAP 
 
U.S. Listing 
 
New Markets 
 
Index Member 
 Year Firms Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms %
1988            605 15 2.5 2 0.3 30 5.0 30 5.0 257 42.5
1989            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           
972 26 2.7 2 0.2 57 5.9 36 3.7 386 39.7
1990 1,323 37 2.8 6 0.5 83 6.3 39 2.9 478 36.1
1991 2,171 65 3.0 13 0.6 111 5.1 44 2.0 761 35.1
1992 2,499 83 3.3 14 0.6 133 5.3 63 2.5 868 34.7
1993 2,770 110 4.0 18 0.6 151 5.5 77 2.8 948 34.2
1994 3,212 172 5.4 22 0.7 189 5.9 76 2.4 1,058 32.9
1995 3,448 183 5.3 22 0.6 226 6.6 92 2.7 1,150 33.4
1996 3,790 226 6.0 30 0.8 283 7.5 138 3.6 1,277 33.7
1997 4,500 275 6.1 29 0.6 350 7.8 161 3.6 1,455 32.3
1998 4,754 296 6.2 34 0.7 392 8.2 171 3.6 1,578 33.2
1999 5,384 389 7.2 71 1.3 417 7.7 118 2.2 1,732 32.2
2000 5,883 505 8.6 115 2.0 449 7.6 157 2.7 1,843 31.3
2001 6,997 641 9.2 189 2.7 495 7.1 270 3.9 2,039 29.1
2002 7,724 708 9.2 222 2.9 522 6.8 284 3.7 2,186 28.3
2003 8,723 749 8.6 228 2.6 473 5.4 281 3.2 2,113 24.2
2004 8,820 826 9.4 210 2.4 439 5.0 275 3.1 2,049 23.2
Total 73,575 5,306 7.2 1,227 1.7 4,800 6.5 2,312 3.1 22,178 30.1
 
The base sample comprises 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004, for which we have sufficient Worldscope and 
Datastream data to estimate our base regressions (see Table 3). We include only countries with at least ten IFRS firm-year observations. Panel A reports the 
number of firms and the number and percentage of firm-year observations by country. Panel B reports the number of observations and corresponding 
percentages by year for various indicator variables (coded one if the definition applies to a given firm-year observation and zero otherwise): IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP indicate financial reports following IFRS and U.S. GAAP, respectively, based on the “accounting standards followed” field in Worldscope (Field 
07536) and adjusted for contradicting coding from a comprehensive manual review of firms’ annual reports (see Appendix A for details). We form a 
separate category, U.S. listing, for companies whose shares are traded over-the-counter or listed on a U.S. exchange. These observations are not included in 
the U.S. GAAP indicator. New market observations stem from firms whose shares are traded on an exchange specializing in technology shares and other 
high-growth stocks and where listing requirements mandate or allow for IFRS reporting, i.e., Bovespa Novo Mercado (Brazil), Expandi market (Italy), 
Neuer Markt (Germany), Nordic Growth Market (Sweden), and Sesdaq (Singapore). Index member represent firms whose shares are constituents of national 
or international stock market indices as defined in Worldscope (Field 05661). 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables across IFRS and Local GAAP Reporting Firms. 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Variable          Accounting Standard N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99
Cost of Capital Local GAAP 11,697 12.7% 4.7% 5.4% 9.3% 11.7% 15.0% 28.7% 
 IFRS 1,879        
        
          
        
12.1% 4.4% 5.4% 8.9% 11.3% 14.2% 26.3%
Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Local GAAP 
 
46,643 0.037 0.045 0.001 0.009 0.020 0.044 0.222 
IFRS 4,906 0.018 0.023 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.023 0.102
Illiquidity
 
Local GAAP
 
68,269 18.748 78.873 0.001 0.058 0.514 4.501 416.968
IFRS 5,306 11.300 60.656 0.001 0.024 0.198 1.984 258.843
 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
Variable           
        
Accounting Standard
 
N Mean Std. Dev.
 
P1 P25 Median P75 P99
Inflation 67,476 2.5% 2.1% 0.0% 1.4% 2.1% 2.9% 9.8%
Total Assets 
 
Local GAAP 
 
67,796 1,252 4,158 1 51 174 646 21,532 
IFRS 5,236        
         
        
      
        
    
         
        
          
        
2,269 5,437 10 130 465 1,723 29,176
Financial Leverage
 
 Local GAAP
 
66,691 0.496 0.248 0.009 0.318 0.510 0.672 0.963
IFRS 5,220 0.544 0.231 0.011 0.397 0.563 0.703 0.969
Forecast Bias 
 
Local GAAP 
 
23,405 0.010 0.042 -0.074 -0.005 0.001 0.013 0.208
IFRS 2,372 0.011 0.042 -0.071 -0.004 0.002 0.014 0.201
Market Value 
 
Local GAAP 68,269 539 1,320 2 31 112 393 7,339 
IFRS 5,306 968 1,903 6 76 257 851 10,442
Return Variability
 
 Local GAAP
 
68,269 0.122 0.077 0.022 0.068 0.099 0.154 0.383
IFRS 5,306 0.124 0.073 0.021 0.073 0.105 0.159 0.358
Share Turnover
 
Local GAAP
 
68,269 0.561 0.888 0.003 0.112 0.305 0.658 4.664
IFRS 5,306 0.531 0.866 0.003 0.112 0.276 0.614 4.517
 
The base sample comprises 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004 with financial data from Worldscope and price/volume data from 
Datastream. We include only countries with at least ten IFRS firm-year observations. IFRS observations are firm-years with financial reports following IFRS according 
to our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification described in Appendix A. The table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (Panel A) 
and the continuous independent variables (Panel B) across IFRS and local GAAP firm-year observations. We use three dependent variables in the analyses: (1) Cost of 
capital is the average cost of capital estimate implied by the mean I/B/E/S analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using the Claus and Thomas (2001) model, the 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) model, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and the Easton (2004) model. We describe these models in more detail 
in Appendix B. (2) The bid-ask spread is the yearly median quoted spread (i.e., difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the 
end of each trading day). (3) Illiquidity is the yearly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by US$ trading volume). 
The independent variables consist of the following measures: Inflation is the yearly median of country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates. Total 
assets are denominated in US$ millions. We compute financial leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Forecast bias equals the one-year-ahead I/B/E/S 
analyst forecast error (mean forecast minus actual) scaled by lagged total assets. Market value is stock price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ millions). 
We compute return variability as annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Share turnover is annual US$ trading volume divided by market value of 
outstanding equity. Accounting data and market values are measured as of the fiscal-year end, the dependent variables, forecast bias, return variability and share 
turnover as of month +10 after the fiscal-year end. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all variables at the first and 99th percentile. 
 
Table 3.  Cost of Capital, Bid-Ask Spread and Liquidity Effects of Voluntary IFRS Adoptions. 
 Cost of Capital 
 
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 
Log(Illiquidity) 
Variables Model 1: Model 2:  Model 1: Model 2:  Model 1: Model 2: 
         
IFRS     
     
    
     
  
    
     
   
   
    
   
    
    
    
   
    
    
     
   
    
   
     
   
     
    
     
      
     
   
    
     
    
      
   
        
0.23 0.23 4.42*** -0.34 6.32* 5.05
 (1.49) (1.22)  (2.81) (0.15) (1.87) (1.17)
IFRS Firm Indicator 
 
 <-0.001  5.78*** 1.56
 (<0.001)
 
 (2.77) (0.40)
 
  
 
 
  
Intercept 13.37*** 13.37***
 
 49.10***
 
48.82*** 1,187.90*** 1,187.84***
(17.08) (17.08) (8.12)
 
(8.08) (137.73) (137.73)
Control Variables:      
U.S. GAAP 0.01 0.01  1.71 1.36  -1.24 -1.30
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.59) (0.46)  (0.20) (0.21)
U.S. Listing -0.50*** -0.50*** 
 
 -0.82 -0.87  -39.60*** -39.60***
(3.16) (3.16) (0.44) (0.47)  (12.18) (12.17)
New Markets -1.12*** -1.12*** 
 
 9.28*** 9.23***  30.65*** 30.60***
(3.40) (3.41) (3.85) (3.81)  (6.06) (6.04)
Index Member -1.54*** -1.54*** 
 
 -15.33*** -15.55***  
 
-55.90*** -55.96***
(11.17) (11.09) (13.11)
 
 
(13.31)
 
(25.35) (25.29)
Inflation 25.38*** 25.38***
 
   
(9.01) (9.01)    
Log(Total Assets) -0.26*** -0.26***    
 (6.40) (6.41)    
Return Variability 9.73*** 9.73*** 
 
   
(10.13) (10.13)    
Financial Leverage 4.29*** 4.29*** 
 
   
(15.17) (15.17)    
Forecast Bias 14.67*** 14.67***
 
    
(10.87) (10.87)    
 Log(Market Valuet-1)
 
 
-32.21*** -32.24***
 
-104.40*** -104.41***
 (115.45)
 
 
(115.57)
 
(179.22)
 
(179.16)
 Log(Share Turnovert-1)
 
 -24.70*** -24.70***  -83.91*** -83.91***
 (70.57)
 
 
(70.30) 
 
 
(124.18) (124.19)
Log(Return Variabilityt-1)
 
 
41.44*** 41.35***
 
 
70.69*** 70.67***
 (53.50)
 
(53.52)
 
(48.31) (48.32)
Country, Year, and  
Industry Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes
 
Yes Yes
 
  
 
  
R2 34.93% 34.93% 78.08% 78.09% 82.92% 82.92%
# Observations 13,576 13,576  51,549     
    
51,549 73,575 73,575
# Unique Firms 3,295 3,295  10,868 10,868  13,653 13,653 
# Countries 18 18  20 20  24 24
(continued) 
 
 The base sample comprises 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004. The cost of capital sample is limited to firm-year 
observations between 1992 and 2004 for which the required I/B/E/S forecast data are available. We include only countries with at least ten IFRS firm-year 
observations. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. We use 
three dependent variables in the analyses: (1) Cost of capital is the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see Appendix B). (2) The bid-
ask spread is the yearly median quoted spread (i.e., difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading 
day). (3) Illiquidity is the yearly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by US$ trading volume). IFRS is a 
binary variable equal to one if the firm reports under IFRS in a particular year. If the firm adopts IFRS in any year during the sample period, we set the IFRS 
firm indicator equal to one for the entire time series. IFRS observations are firm-years with financial reports following IFRS according to our augmented 
Worldscope accounting standards classification described in Appendix A. For a description of the control variables see Table 1 (indicator variables) and Table 
2 (continuous variables). We use the natural log of the raw values and lag the variables by one year where indicated. We include industry-fixed effects based 
on the classification in Campbell (1996), country- and year-fixed effects in the regressions but do not report the coefficients. For expositional purposes we 
multiply all coefficients by 100. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 Table 4.   Univariate Analysis of Cost of Capital, Bid-Ask Spread and Liquidity Effects across Label and Serious IFRS 
Adopters. 
Median Values and Number of Observations 
Panel A: Cost of Capital Effects 
         
  
Annual Report 
Page Numbers     
Cairns  
IFRS Report   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
11.6% 11.2% -0.4% 11.3% 10.0% -1.3%*** IFRS  
(a) 262 432  
IFRS  
(a) 1,411 321  
11.7%  11.6%  Local GAAP  
(b) 11,372  
Local GAAP  
(b) 10,524  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.1% -0.5%***  Difference (a) – (b) -0.2%*** -1.5%***  
         
  
Magnitude  
of Accruals     
Reporting  
Incentives Factor   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
11.4% 11.3% -0.1% 12.7% 10.4% -2.3%*** IFRS  
(a) 444 250  
IFRS  
(a) 860 1,019  
11.7%  11.7%  Local GAAP  
(b) 11,372  
Local GAAP  
(b) 11,697  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.4%* -0.4%*  Difference (a) – (b) 1.0%*** -1.3%***  
         
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread Effects 
         
  
Annual Report 
Page Numbers     
Cairns  
IFRS Report   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
0.013 0.010 -0.003*** 0.013 0.006 -0.007*** IFRS  
(a) 833 1,155  
IFRS  
(a) 3,425 377  
0.020  0.022  Local GAAP  
(b) 45,833  
Local GAAP  
(b) 38,837  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.007*** -0.010***  Difference (a) – (b) -0.008*** -0.016***  
         
  
Magnitude  
of Accruals     
Reporting  
Incentives Factor   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
0.012 0.010 -0.002*** 0.016 0.007 -0.009*** IFRS  
(a) 1,507 481  
IFRS  
(a) 2,888 2,018  
0.020  0.020  Local GAAP  
(b) 45,833  
Local GAAP  
(b) 46,643  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.008*** -0.011***  Difference (a) – (b) -0.004*** -0.013***  
         
(continued) 
 Table 4.  (Continued) 
Median Values and Number of Observations 
Panel C: Share Illiquidity Effects 
         
  
Annual Report 
Page Numbers     
Cairns  
IFRS Report   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
0.315 0.165 -0.150*** 0.283 0.013 -0.270*** IFRS  
(a) 936 1,245  
IFRS  
(a) 3,789 414  
0.527  0.654  Local GAAP  
(b) 67,383  
Local GAAP  
(b) 60,587  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.212*** -0.362***  Difference (a) – (b) -0.371*** -0.641***  
         
  
Magnitude  
of Accruals     
Reporting  
Incentives Factor   
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 Label 
Adopters 
(1) 
Serious 
Adopters 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
0.253 0.140 -0.113*** 0.891 0.033 -0.858*** IFRS  
(a) 1,661 520  
IFRS  
(a) 3,062 2,244  
0.527  0.514  Local GAAP  
(b) 67,383  
Local GAAP  
(b) 68,269  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.274*** -0.387***  Difference (a) – (b) 0.378*** -0.481***  
         
 
The base sample comprises 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004. The cost of capital sample 
is limited to firm-year observations between 1992 and 2004 for which the required I/B/E/S forecast data are available. We include 
only countries with at least ten IFRS firm-year observations. The table reports median values of the dependent variables and the 
number of observations across firms reporting under local GAAP, serious IFRS adopters and label IFRS adopters. We use three 
dependent variables in the analyses: (1) Cost of capital is the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see 
Appendix B). (2) The bid-ask spread is the yearly median quoted spread (i.e., difference between the bid and ask price divided by 
the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day). (3) Illiquidity is the yearly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure (i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by US$ trading volume). IFRS observations are firm-years with financial reports 
following IFRS according to our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification described in Appendix A. In each 
panel, we partition the IFRS firm-years into those stemming from serious and label IFRS adopters using the following criteria: (1) 
the annual report page numbers classification designates firms as serious adopters if the mean annual report page number in the 
three years immediately following the IFRS adoption increases compared to the two pre-adoption years. (2) We use the Cairns 
(1999, 2000) IFRS survey reports of how firms adopted IFRS and identify serious adopters when the annual report is in full 
compliance with IFRS (i.e., compliance score equals 1 or 2). (3) We measure firms’ magnitude of accruals by the yearly absolute 
value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. We classify firms as serious IFRS adopters if the 
magnitude of accruals averaged over the four post-adoption years decreases compared to the four pre-adoption years. (4) Using 
factor analysis, we summarize the following variables into a single factor indicating the strength of firms’ reporting incentives: 
market value of equity, financial leverage, return on assets, Tobin’s Q, percent of closely-held shares and percent of firms’ foreign 
sales out of total sales. We classify firms as serious IFRS adopters if their (time-series) average factor score is above the median 
average factor score for all IFRS firms. For classifications (1) and (3), we limit our analysis to the initial four IFRS firm-years 
after the adoption. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of median differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
tailed), respectively, based on a Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 Table 5.   Regression Analysis of Cost of Capital, Bid-Ask Spread and Liquidity Effects across Label and Serious IFRS 
Adopters. 
Panel A: Cost of Capital as Dependent Variable 
 Label versus Serious IFRS Adopter Classifications 
 Annual Report  
Page Numbers 
Cairns  
IFRS Report 
Magnitude  
of Accruals 
Reporting  
Incentives Factor 
     
IFRS 1.05*** 0.18 0.77*** 1.15*** 
 (3.21) (1.07) (3.12) (5.34) 
Serious IFRS Adopters -0.82** -0.45 -0.64* -1.60*** 
 (2.12) (1.41) (1.69) (6.25) 
F-Test (p-value) (0.33) (0.39) (0.71) (0.01) 
     
Intercept: 13.59*** 13.21*** 13.62*** 13.21*** 
 (16.06) (16.79) (16.02) (17.02) 
Control Variables:     
U.S. GAAP 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.02) (0.31) 
U.S. Listing -0.43** -0.58*** -0.42** -0.49*** 
 (2.46) (3.47) (2.40) (3.13) 
New Markets -1.36*** -0.98*** -1.28*** -1.41*** 
 (3.64) (2.96) (3.46) (4.34) 
Index Member -1.55*** -1.52*** -1.55*** -1.46*** 
 (10.64) (10.61) (10.62) (10.65) 
Inflation 25.47*** 25.79*** 25.57*** 25.15*** 
 (8.50) (8.91) (8.53) (8.94) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.25*** 
 (6.53) (6.41) (6.56) (6.13) 
Return Variability 9.58*** 9.29*** 9.57*** 9.77*** 
 (9.44) (9.28) (9.43) (10.19) 
Financial Leverage 4.27*** 4.38*** 4.27*** 0.0422*** 
 (14.31) (14.74) (14.31) (15.01) 
Forecast Bias 13.82*** 15.39*** 13.85*** 14.50*** 
 (9.86) (10.73) (9.87) (10.77) 
    
Country, Year, and  
Industry Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 35.2% 35.7% 35.2% 35.3% 
# Observations 12,066 12,256 12,066 13,576 
# Unique Firms 3,013 2,984 3,013 3,295 
# Countries 18 16 18 18 
(continued) 
 Table 5.  (Continued) 
Panel B: Log(Bid-Ask Spread) as Dependent Variable 
 Label versus Serious IFRS Adopter Classifications 
 Annual Report  
Page Numbers 
Cairns  
IFRS Report 
Magnitude  
of Accruals 
Reporting  
Incentives Factor 
     
IFRS 2.97 -3.29** 1.75 8.29*** 
 (0.97) (2.15) (0.81) (4.09) 
Serious IFRS Adopters -5.83 -9.53** -8.99** -9.33*** 
 (1.61) (2.57) (2.25) (3.49) 
F-Test (p-value) (0.21) (0.00) (0.05) (0.62) 
     
Intercept: 26.44*** 51.76*** 26.55*** 47.86*** 
 (4.24) (7.73) (4.26) (7.92) 
Control Variables:     
U.S. GAAP -3.95 -1.62 -4.04 2.38 
 (1.22) (0.56) (1.26) (0.82) 
U.S. Listing -2.54 -6.16*** -2.45 -0.88 
 (1.39) (3.56) (1.33) (0.48) 
New Markets 14.03*** 10.37*** 14.21*** 7.92*** 
 (4.92) (4.31) (5.06) (3.21) 
Index Member -16.41*** -17.86*** -16.39*** -15.17*** 
 (13.58) (14.48) (13.57) (12.97) 
Log(Market Valuet-1) -31.89*** -31.75*** -31.90*** -32.10*** 
 (110.29) (107.19) (110.43) (115.00) 
Log(Share Turnovert-1) -23.87*** -23.17*** -23.86*** -24.69*** 
 (66.06) (60.82) (66.09) (70.58) 
Log(Return Variabilityt-1) 41.46*** 37.93*** 41.46*** 41.47*** 
 (51.47) (45.28) (51.48) (53.47) 
     
Country, Year, and  
Industry Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 78.1% 74.5% 78.1% 78.1% 
# Observations 47,821 42,639 47,821 51,549 
# Unique Firms 10,358 7,739 10,358 10,868 
# Countries 20 14 20 20 
(continued) 
 Table 5.  (Continued) 
Panel C: Log(Illiquidity) as Dependent Variable 
 Label versus Serious IFRS Adopter Classifications 
 Annual Report  
Page Numbers 
Cairns  
IFRS Report 
Magnitude  
of Accruals 
Reporting  
Incentives Factor 
     
IFRS 9.49 -2.36 10.91** 28.69*** 
 (1.47) (0.61) (2.13) (6.69) 
Serious IFRS Adopters -2.31 -48.70*** -11.51 -52.79*** 
 (0.29) (4.49) (1.40) (9.39) 
F-Test (p-value) (0.19) (0.00) (0.93) (0.00) 
     
Intercept: 1,095.89*** 1,175.45*** 1,095.83*** 1,182.81*** 
 (120.82) (128.45) (120.83) (137.54) 
Control Variables:     
U.S. GAAP -1.30 -6.95 -1.27 0.51 
 (0.20) (1.01) (0.19) (0.08) 
U.S. Listing -40.59*** -40.74*** -40.53*** -40.13*** 
 (11.81) (11.61) (11.79) (12.32) 
New Markets 33.71*** 35.60*** 33.62*** 25.35*** 
 (5.84) (5.73) (5.86) (5.04) 
Index Member -57.66*** -59.70*** -57.64*** -55.03*** 
 (25.41) (25.48) (25.39) (24.99) 
Log(Market Valuet-1) -103.30*** -102.93*** -103.30*** -103.93*** 
 (172.85) (166.49) (172.87) (179.00) 
Log(Share Turnovert-1) -82.19*** -81.90*** -82.18*** -83.86*** 
 (119.45) (113.37) (119.49) (124.57) 
Log(Return Variabilityt-1) 70.36*** 69.85*** 70.36*** 70.81*** 
 (47.19) (44.55) (47.19) (48.54) 
     
Country, Year, and  
Industry Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 82.9% 83.0% 82.9% 83.0% 
# Observations 69,564 64,790 69,564 73,575 
# Unique Firms 13,134 11,419 13,134 13,653 
# Countries 24 19 24 24 
 
The base sample comprises 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004. The cost of capital 
sample is limited to firm-year observations between 1992 and 2004 for which the required I/B/E/S forecast data are available. 
We include only countries with at least ten IFRS firm-year observations. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. It also reports p-values from an F-test 
indicating joint statistical significance of the coefficients on IFRS and serious IFRS adopters. We use three dependent 
variables in the analyses: (1) Cost of capital is the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see Appendix 
B). (2) The bid-ask spread is the yearly median quoted spread. (3) Illiquidity is the yearly median of the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure. IFRS is a binary variable indicating firm-years with financial reports following IFRS according to our 
augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification described in Appendix A.  Serious IFRS adopters is a binary 
variable that is set equal to 1 using one of the following classifications: (1) the annual report page numbers classification 
designates firms as serious adopters if the mean annual report page number in the three years immediately following the 
IFRS adoption increases compared to the two pre-adoption years. (2) We use the Cairns (1999, 2000) IFRS survey reports of 
how firms adopted IFRS and identify serious adopters when the annual report is in full compliance with IFRS (i.e., Cairns 
compliance score 1 or 2). (3) We measure firms’ magnitude of accruals by the yearly absolute value of accruals scaled by the 
absolute value of cash flow from operations. We classify firms as serious IFRS adopters if the magnitude of accruals 
averaged over the four post-adoption years decreases compared to the four pre-adoption years. (4) Using factor analysis, we 
summarize the following variables into a single factor indicating the strength of firms’ reporting incentives: market value of 
equity, financial leverage, return on assets, Tobin’s Q, percent of closely-held shares and percent of firms’ foreign sales out 
of total sales. We classify firms as serious IFRS adopters if their average factor score is above the median average factor 
score for all IFRS firms. For classifications (1) and (3), we limit our analysis to the initial four IFRS firm-years after the 
adoption. For a description of the control variables see Table 1 (indicator variables) and Table 2 (continuous variables). We 
use the natural log of the raw values and lag the variables by one year where indicated. We include industry-fixed effects 
based on the classification in Campbell (1996), country- and year-fixed effects in the regressions but do not report the 
coefficients. For expositional purposes we multiply all coefficients by 100. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 Table A1.  Definition of Accounting Standards Classifications. 
Panel A: Coding Based on Worldscope (WS) “Accounting Standards Followed” (Field 07536) 
WS Code WS Description 
Coding for 
analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IFRS if one of the following cases applies: IFRS 
02 International standards  
06 International standards and some EU guidelines  
08 Local standards with EU and IASC guidelines  
12 International standards – inconsistency problems  
16 International standards and some EU guidelines – inconsistency problems  
18 Local standards with some IASC guidelines  
19 Local standards with OECD and IASC guidelines  
23 IFRS  
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: U.S. GAAP 
03 U.S. standards (GAAP)  
13 US standards – inconsistency problems  
20 US GAAP reclassified from local standards  
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
01 Local standards  
05 EU standards  
07 Specific standards set by the group  
09 Not disclosed  
10 Local standards with some EU guidelines  
11 Local standards – inconsistency problems  
14 Commonwealth standards – inconsistency problems  
15 EEC standards – inconsistency problems  
17 Local standards with some OECD guidelines  
21 Local standards with a certain reclassification for foreign companies  
22 Other  
 
Panel B: Coding Based on Global Vantage (GV) “Accounting Standard” (Field ASTD) 
GV Code GV Description 
Coding for 
analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IFRS if one of the following cases applies: IFRS 
DA Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines   
DI Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC guidelines   
DT Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the 
United States and generally in accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines  
 
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: U.S. GAAP 
DU Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the U.S.  
MU Modified United States’ standards (Japanese companies’ financial statements 
translated into English) 
 
US United States’ standards  
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
DD Domestic standards for parents and domestic subsidiaries. Native country or 
United States’ standards for overseas subsidiaries  
 
DO Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD guidelines   
DR Accounts reclassified to show allowance for doubtful accounts and/or 
accumulated depreciation as a reduction of assets rather than liabilities  
 
DS Domestic standards   
MI Accounts reclassified by SPCS to combine separate life insurance and non-life 
insurance accounts  
 
LJ Combination DR and MI   
(continued) 
 Table A1.  (Continued) 
Panel C: Hand-coded Classification Based on Firms’ Annual Reports 
Description 
Coding for 
analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IFRS if one of the following cases applies:  
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to IAS/IFRS standards only 
(2) Annual report has two separate sections with two full sets of consolidated financial 
statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows), one set under local 
GAAP, and one set under IAS/IFRS (Parallel Reporting) 
(3) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to IAS/IFRS in the first place, but also 
refers to compliance with local GAAP 
(4) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP in the first place, but also 
refers to compliance with IAS/IFRS 
(5) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full compliance with local GAAP, but 
also to application of IAS/IFRS standards if local GAAP is silent about a reporting issue 
(Dual Reporting) 
(6) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full application local GAAP, but there 
is also a reconciliation of net income and/or shareholders’ equity to IAS/IFRS in a 
separate section of the annual report (Reconciliation) 
IFRS 
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: 
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to U.S. GAAP standards only 
(2) Annual report has two separate sections with two full sets of consolidated financial 
statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows), one set under local 
GAAP, and one set under U.S. GAAP (Parallel Reporting) 
(3) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to U.S. GAAP in the first place, but also 
refers to compliance with local GAAP 
(4) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP in the first place, but also 
refers to compliance with U.S. GAAP 
(5) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full compliance with local GAAP, but 
also to application of U.S. GAAP standards if local GAAP is silent about a reporting 
issue (Dual Reporting) 
(6) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full application local GAAP, but there 
is also a reconciliation of net income and/or shareholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in a 
separate section of the annual report (Reconciliation) 
U.S. GAAP 
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: 
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP only 
(2) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP only, but selected 
individual IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP standards are applied on specific reporting issues 
(e.g. Leasing IAS 17, Segment Reporting SFAS 131) 
Local 
 
The table describes the assignment of firm-year observations to the three categories reporting under IFRS, U.S. 
GAAP or local GAAP using the accounting standards classification in Worldscope (Panel A), Global Vantage 
(Panel B), and our own classification applied to a comprehensive set of firms’ annual reports collected through 
Thomson Research (Panel C). 
 Table A2. Comparison of Accounting Standards Classifications by Data Source (Based on Sample Used in Main 
Analyses, i.e., 73,575 Observations). 
Panel A: Worldscope versus Global Vantage Classifications 
  Comprehensive Coding for IFRS   Stricter Coding for IFRS 
  Worldscope Classification  Worldscope Classification 
Global Vantage 
Classification IFRS 
U.S. 
GAAP Local Total  IFRS 
U.S. 
GAAP Local Total 
IFRS  2,537 9 868 3,414  2,199 9 1,074 3,282 
  3.5% 0.0% 1.2% 4.6%  3.0% 0.0% 1.5% 4.5% 
U.S. GAAP  51 668 196 915  5 170 156 331 
  0.1% 0.9% 0.3% 1.2%  0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 
Local  2,760 194 42,933 45,887  839 692 45,072 46,603 
  3.8% 0.3% 58.4% 62.4%  1.1% 1.0% 61.3% 63.3% 
Not covered  957 331 22,071 23,359  495 331 22,533 23,359 
  1.3% 0.5% 30.0% 31.8%  0.7% 0.5% 30.6% 31.8% 
Total  6,305 1,202 66,068 73,575  3,538 1,202 68,835 73,575 
   8.6% 1.6% 89.8% 100.0%  4.8% 1.6% 93.6% 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Hand-coded Classification versus Worldscope and Global Vantage Classifications 
  Worldscope Classification  Global Vantage Classification 
Hand-coded 
Classification  IFRS 
U.S. 
GAAP Local 
Not 
covered Total  IFRS 
U.S. 
GAAP Local 
Not 
covered Total 
IFRS  3,724 10 829 - 4,563 2,639 15 1,308 601 4,563
  5.1% 0.0% 1.1% 6.2% 3.6% 0.0% 1.8% 0.8% 6.2%
U.S. GAAP  57 884 447 - 1,388 33 617 424 314 1,388
  0.1% 1.2% 0.6%  1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 1.9%
Local  1,781 59 3,752 - 5,592 439 80 3,937 1,136 5,592
  2.4% 0.1% 5.1%  7.6% 0.6% 0.1% 5.4% 1.5% 7.6%
 743 249 61,040 - 62,032 303 203 40,218 21,308 62,032No annual 
report data  1.0% 0.3% 83.0%  84.3% 0.4% 0.3% 54.7% 29.0% 84.3%
Total  6,305 1,202 66,068 - 73,575 3,414 915 45,887 23,359 73,575
  8.6% 1.6% 89.8% 100.0% 4.6% 1.2% 62.4% 31.8% 100.0%
 
Panel C: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients of IFRS Classifications across Data Sources 
 
Worldscope
Classification
Global Vantage
Classification
Hand-coded Classification 0.710 0.730 
   p-values (0.000) (0.000) 
   N 11,543 9,492 
Worldscope Classification  0.557 
   p-values  (0.000) 
   N  50,216 
 
The table presents the number of observations and percentages across different accounting standards classifications for 
our base sample comprising 73,575 firm-year observations from 24 countries between 1988 and 2004 with sufficient 
Worldscope and Datastream data to compute the control variables. In Panel A, we compare IFRS, U.S. GAAP or local 
GAAP firm-year observations based on the accounting standards classification in Worldscope and Global Vantage. 
The first half of the panel applies the coding scheme as outlined in Table A1. In the second half we use a stricter 
coding definition for IFRS observations consisting of Worldscope categories 02 (“International standards”) and 23 
(“IFRS”) together with Global Vantage category DI (“Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC 
guidelines”). In Panel B, we compare our own classification based on a comprehensive manual review of firms’ annual 
reports (see Table A1, Panel C) to the coding based on Worldscope and Global Vantage. Panel C reports the respective 
Pearson correlations across the three data sources. 
Table A3.  Comparison of Accounting Standards Classifications by Country. 
  Worldscope Classification   Global Vantage Classification   Hand-coded Classification 
  IFRS U.S. GAAP   IFRS  U.S. GAAP   IFRS U.S. GAAP 
Country       n n %  n % n n %   n % n n %  n %
Argentina          899 3 0.3 10 1.1 361 0 0 6 1.7 337 3 0.9 7 2.1
Australia
 
         
        
         
     
        
         
         
      
         
          
        
        
         
         
         
       
         
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
        
          
     
12,371 142 1.1 22 0.2 4,917 17 0.3 8 0.2 4,044 134 3.3 23 0.6
Austria 2,027 332 16.4 44 2.2 1,183 282 23.8 38 3.2 1,245 343 27.6 43 3.5
Belgium 3,022 187 6.2 39 1.3 1,636 135 8.3 48 2.9 1,341 179 13.3 55 4.1
Bermuda
 
315 50 15.9 120 38.1  4,422 268 6.1 86 1.9  220 51 23.2  47.7105
Brazil 3,673 2 0.1 6 0.2 1,698 0 0 2 0.1 1,374 1 0.1 1 0.1
Canada 17,502 87 0.5 418 2.4 9,641 13 0.1 24 0.2 7,669 40 0.5 529 6.9
Chile 2,063 1 0 2 0.1 1,106 0 0 1 0.1 998 0 0.0  0.00
China 10,598 1,144 10.8 108 1  14,066
 
224 1.6 4 0  8,515 1,157 13.6 54 0.6
Colombia 527 0 0 0 0 265 0 0 0 0 197 0 0.0 0 0.0
Czech Republic
 
470 90 19.1 0 0 194 73 37.6 0 0 206 68 33.0 0 0.0
Denmark 3,854 141 3.7 14 0.4 2,086 118 5.7 0 0 1,853 155 8.4 23 1.2
Egypt 145 2 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 2,697 70 2.6 0 0 1,359 95 7 3 0.2 1,298 79 6.1 8 0.6
France 15,533 961 6.2 182 1.2 8,100 591 7.3 200 2.5 5,529 347 6.3 197 3.6
Germany 15,744 1,685 10.7 714 4.5 8,212 1,632 19.9 841 10.2 7,681 1,723 22.4 679
 
8.8
Greece 3,133 43 1.4 29 0.9 742 38 5.1 16 2.2 629 41 6.5 23 3.7
Hong Kong
 
8,855 200 2.3 59 0.7 2,374 13 0.5 2 0.1 5,793 163 2.8 33 0.6
Hungary
 
380 192 50.5 7 1.8 182 132 72.5 8 4.4 225 154 68.4 0 0.0
India 4,547 8 0.2 17 0.4 2,644 4 0.2 6 0.2 2,010 0 0.0 18 0.9
Indonesia
 
3,268 1 0 0 0 2,541 0 0 7 0.3 2,204 0 0.0 7 0.3
Ireland 1,498 40 2.7 30 2 784 1 0.1 6 0.8 660 0 0.0 27 4.1
Israel 1,264 45 3.6 361 28.6 646 21 3.3 112 17.3 785 49 6.2  410 52.2
Italy 5,544 4,364 78.7 8 0.1 2,944 6 0.2 18 0.6 3,246 813 25.0 34 1.0
Japan 56,817 133 0.2 944 1.7 45,184 5 0 348 0.8 36,667 0 0.0 637 1.7
Korea (South) 8,566 10 0.1 5 0.1 2,146 0 0 2 0.1 1,987 0 0.0 5 0.3
Luxembourg
 
484 99 20.5 50 10.3 305 93 30.5 39 12.8 191 107 56.0 25 13.1
Malaysia 9,123 24 0.3 0 0 8,167 34 0.4 0 0 6,718 2 0.0 0 0.0
Mexico 1,993 7 0.4 8 0.4 977 8 0.8 3 0.3 862 10 1.2 15 1.7
Morocco 140 1 0.7 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(continued) 
 
Table A3.  (Continued) 
  Worldscope Classification   Global Vantage Classification   Hand-coded Classification 
  IFRS U.S. GAAP   IFRS  U.S. GAAP   IFRS U.S. GAAP 
Country     n n %  n % n n %   n % n n %  n %
The Netherlands 4,295 185 4.3  232 5.4  2,533 95 3.8  162 6.4  2,151 131 6.1  192 8.9 
New Zealand 1,463 31 2.1  0 0  756 12 1.6  25 3.3  629 6 1.0  28 4.5 
Norway     
     
       
   
        
     
  
       
     
   
      
    
      
     
    
3,120 35 1.1 63 2  1,722 23 1.3  27
 
1.6  1,411 30 2.1 67 4.7
Pakistan 1,017 16 1.6 0 0  454 12 2.6  0 0  432 68 15.7 0 0.0
Peru 812 10
 
1.2  0.54 0 0 0 0 0 283 149 52.7  2.16
Philippines 2,117 2 0.1  18 0.9  1,575 134 8.5  10 0.6  789 7 0.9 21 2.7
Poland 880 82 9.3 5 0.6 362 59 16.3 0 0 243 56 23.0  2.15
Portugal 1,368 33 2.4 1 0.1  551 21 3.8  0 0  351 36 10.3 0 0.0
Russian Federation  
 
387 113 29.2  81 20.9  150 60 40  51 34  220 91 41.4  57 25.9 
Singapore 5,465 147 2.7  35 0.6  4,410 17 0.4  22 0.5  3,996 139 3.5 39 1.0
South Africa 5,936 75 1.3  4 0.1  1,740 149 8.6  5 0.3  1,452 162 11.2  4 0.3 
Spain 3,313 22 0.7 7 0.2  1,906 8 0.4 5 0.3 1,556 6 0.4 5 0.3
Sri Lanka 256 0 0  0 0  0 0 0  0 0  0 0 0 0 
Sweden 5,376 174 3.2 0 0  3,099 132 4.3  22 0.7  2,651 93 3.5 14 0.5
Switzerland 4,863 1,515 31.2  130 2.7  3,113 1,294 41.6  105 3.4  3,207 1,356 42.3 117 3.6
Taiwan 8,873 1 0 11 0.1  2,477 0 0 0 0  2,249 0 0.0 15 0.7
Thailand 5,033 5 0.1 0 0  4,140 9 0.2  1 0  3,530 4 0.1 0 0.0
Turkey 1,921 255 13.3 2 0.1  469 156 33.3 10 2.1  945 276 29.2 6 0.6
United Kingdom 37,700 233 0.6  83 0.2  18,228 56 0.3  50
 
0.3  15,669 170 1.1  53 0.3 
Venezuela 454 3 0.7 17 3.7  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 291,701 13,001 4.5 3,890 1.3 178,459 6,227 3.5 2,345 1.3 146,248 8,399 5.7 3,587 2.5
 
The sample comprises all firm-year observations in Worldscope and Global Vantage from countries with at least 20 observations and with total assets available in a particular 
year. The hand-coded classification is based on 27,589 observations from firms that Worldscope or Global Vantage identify as potential IFRS/U.S. GAAP adopters and where 
we were able to collect annual reports through Thomson Research. The table reports the total number of firm-years and the number and percent of IFRS or U.S. GAAP 
observations, using the accounting standards classifications outlined in Table A1. We compute the percentage values for the hand-coded sample based on all firms that are 
uniformly classified as reporting under local GAAP by Worldscope and Global Vantage. 
 
 
